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COMBATING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
IN CLOSING ARGUMENTS
MICHAEL D. CICCHINI*
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments is rampant. Prosecutors
make improper arguments because it is a highly effective, yet virtually riskfree, strategy. That is, even if the defense lawyer quickly identifies and
objects to the misconduct, the jury has already heard the improper
argument, the available remedies are toothless, and the offending
prosecutor rarely suffers any consequences. This Article proposes an
alternative approach for combating this problem. Rather than waiting to
object until after the prosecutor makes the improper argument, defense
counsel should consider a more aggressive strategy: the pretrial motion in
limine. This motion seeks a pretrial order to prevent the misconduct before
it occurs, and in cases where the prosecutor violates the order, it
establishes a framework for addressing the misconduct in a meaningful
way.
This preemptive strategy has several advantages over the conventional,
reactionary approach. First, even if the motion in limine fails to deter the
misconduct, it alerts the trial judge to the improper arguments before the
prosecutor makes them. Second, it preserves the issue for meaningful trialcourt review, outside of the jury’s presence, without defense counsel having
to raise difficult and risky objections in the middle of closing arguments.
Third, the motion-in-limine approach also provides a framework for
developing meaningful remedies for the misconduct. These include
providing the opportunity to draft thoughtful and effective curative
instructions and affording time for client consultation before requesting the
more serious remedy of a mistrial. And fourth, in the event a mistrial is
declared, the motion-in-limine approach may even protect the defendant
from re-prosecution.
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Introduction
When a prosecutor makes improper closing arguments to a jury, he or
she violates the defendant’s due process and other constitutional rights. Yet,
despite the prosecutor’s supposed role as “minister of justice,” rampant
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument still exists. Anecdotal reports,
appellate court decisions, and even published studies demonstrate that such
misconduct has become the norm rather than the exception.
Prosecutors abuse the closing argument process for two primary reasons.
First, they know that improper arguments are highly effective, stirring
jurors’ emotions and inviting them to convict for reasons other than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, and equally important, prosecutors
have learned that this form of misconduct is virtually risk free: the difficulty
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defense lawyers face in quickly identifying and immediately responding to
improper arguments typically results in the prosecutor’s misconduct going
unchecked and the state gaining an illegal advantage without repercussion.
Moreover, even when the defense lawyer is able to quickly identify and
object to the misconduct, doing so may cause more harm than good.
Further, the available remedies are often ineffective.
Worse yet, the conventional, reactionary approach to improper argument
only encourages this form of prosecutorial misconduct. This Article
therefore proposes a more aggressive strategy for combating—and possibly
even deterring—prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments: the pretrial
motion in limine.
Part I discusses the importance of closing arguments and the widespread
nature of prosecutorial misconduct in this phase of the criminal trial. Part II
takes the first step in combating this form of misconduct by helping the
defense lawyer identify and understand many common forms of improper
argument. Part III examines the numerous problems with the conventional,
after-the-fact approach to dealing with prosecutorial misconduct, including
the risks associated with objecting in the middle of closing arguments and
the general ineffectiveness of the available remedies when an objection is
sustained.
Part IV of this Article then outlines the alternative approach to
combating this form of prosecutorial misconduct. Instead of waiting for the
improper argument and then objecting after the jury hears it, defense
counsel should anticipate and preempt the misconduct via a pretrial motion
in limine. This motion-in-limine approach educates the trial judge about the
various forms of improper argument, seeks a pretrial order prohibiting these
arguments before the prosecutor can make them, and protects the defendant
in the event the prosecutor violates the court’s order. If granted, the pretrial
motion in limine relieves defense counsel from having to raise risky, midargument objections to the misconduct, yet still preserves the issue for trialand appellate-court review. The motion in limine also establishes a
framework for developing meaningful remedies for the prosecutor’s
unethical behavior. It provides defense counsel and the trial judge the
opportunity to craft effective curative instructions and affords defense
counsel sufficient time to consult with the defendant before requesting the
serious remedy of a mistrial. Further, in the event the court grants a mistrial
request, the motion-in-limine approach may even protect the defendant
from a retrial.
Appendix A provides a sample motion in limine, and Appendix B
provides sample curative instructions tailored to specific types of improper
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arguments. Such instructions can, in some cases, provide an adequate
remedy for the prosecutor’s misconduct.
I. Closing Arguments to the Jury
Closing arguments are “often viewed as the most important part of the
trial, providing the attorneys with their last opportunity to convince the jury
of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” 1 More specifically, the closing
argument allows the attorneys “to sum up the evidence within a narrative
framework to help the jury understand and interpret the evidence.” 2 This
includes arguing about the “reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence,” the “credibility and demeanor of witnesses,” and the “credibility
of evidence generally.”3 The attorneys may also “help the jury understand
the issues by applying the evidence to the law.” 4 In the rebuttal portion of
the closing argument, the prosecutor may “respond to arguments of
[defense] counsel.”5
With regard to criminal prosecutions, courts have stated that the
prosecutor “occupies a semijudicial position,” 6 and the rules of professional
conduct have grandly ordained the prosecutor as “minister of justice.” 7
Consequently, “a prosecutor’s duty, above being an advocate for the State,
is to ensure that a defendant is afforded a fair trial.”8 Yet, despite these
grand titles and lofty standards, prosecutorial misconduct is rampant in
closing argument, its variety limited only by the prosecutor’s imagination
1. Michael Lyon, Avoiding the Woodshed: The Third Circuit Examines Prosecutorial
Misconduct in Closing Argument in United States v. Wood, 53 VILL. L. REV. 689, 689
(2008) (citing Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 DICK. L. REV. 85, 113
(1994)).
2. Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows, 49 GA. L. REV. 309, 320 (2015)
(citing Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50
TEX. L. REV. 629, 643 (1972)).
3. J. Thomas Sullivan, Prosecutor Misconduct in Closing Argument in Arkansas
Criminal Trials, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 213, 219 (1998) (first citing Richmond v.
State, 899 S.W.2d 64 (Ark. 1999); then citing Shannon v. State, 942 S.W.2d 591, 597 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996)).
4. Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 963 (Fla. 1996).
5. Bowman, supra note 2, at 320 (citing Craig Lee Montz, Why Lawyers Continue to
Cross the Line in Closing Arguments: An Examination of Federal and State Cases, 28 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 67, 73 (2001)).
6. Roach v. State, 146 So. 240, 240 (Fla. 1933).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
8. Claire Gagnon, A Liar by Any Other Name? Iowa’s Closing Argument Conundrum,
55 DRAKE L. REV. 471, 478 (2007) (citing State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 876 (Iowa
2003)).
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and boldness.9 In many cases, improper prosecutorial arguments violate a
defendant’s due process rights 10 and, depending on the particular argument,
other constitutional rights.11
A prosecutor often commits this form of misconduct because, by the end
of the jury trial, he or she “may have become so devoted to winning the
case . . . that his or her emotions intrude and result in a ‘win at all costs’
closing argument not based on the facts brought out during trial.”12 One
explanation for this behavior is that “[c]onfirmation bias leads prosecutors
to be overconfident in their conclusions about the guilt of particular
defendants.”13 This process is often set in motion when the prosecutor’s
office first receives a referral from law enforcement and, despite having
limited information, concludes that the suspect is guilty. 14 Then, throughout
the case, the prosecutor focuses on information that confirms this
preexisting determination of guilt while discounting—or even ignoring—
information that contradicts it.15
Regardless of the underlying explanation, prosecutorial misconduct in
closing argument can be incredibly harmful. “Although argument does not
constitute evidence and the jury is instructed not to consider it as such, the
use of dramatic, compelling, or even inflammatory argument reflects a
perception that argument is a valuable ingredient of the deliberative
process. . . .”16 And scientific evidence supports this perception: “Empirical
research on the ‘recency effect’ suggests that people tend to remember best
9. See infra Part II.
10. See, e.g., State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 867 (Iowa 2003); State v. Singh, 793
A.2d 226, 232 (Conn. 2002).
11. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (finding that the
prosecutor’s comment on the defendant’s decision not to testify was improper and violated
the Fifth Amendment); State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 589 (Tenn. 2014) (same); State v.
Jorgensen, 754 N.W.2d 77, 90 (Wis. 2008) (stating that the prosecutor’s argument about
facts not adduced at trial violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation).
12. Candice D. Tobin, Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing Argument: Florida
Case Law, 22 NOVA L. REV. 485, 488 (1997).
13. Bowman, supra note 2, at 329 (citing Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 371).
14. See id. (citing Findlay & Scott, supra note 13, at 329–30) (“The information
provided to prosecutors may be incomplete because the police investigation may have been
shaped by tunnel vision.”).
15. See id. (citing Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that
Aggravate and Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 315, 316 (2009)) (“Because of confirmation bias, people unwittingly select and
interpret information to support their preexisting beliefs.”).
16. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 214.
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and be influenced by the latest event in a sequence more than by earlier
events.”17 Because jurors enter deliberations with closing arguments—
especially the prosecutor’s rebuttal—still ringing in their ears, those words
could have more impact than the actual evidence presented much earlier in
the case. 18
Although other empirical research demonstrates that some jurors will
have made up their minds by the time closing argument begins, 19 such
findings do not minimize the harmful effects of the prosecutor’s
misconduct. Even though some jurors may have already decided the
defendant’s guilt, the prosecutor’s closing argument provides “ammunition
for them to use in the jury room ‘so that they can become an extension of
the advocate.’”20
Further, prosecutorial misconduct may be as frequent as it is harmful. As
far back as 1987, for example, one judge conceded that prosecutorial
misconduct in closing argument is “chronicled with alarming regularity.” 21
Nonetheless, he maintained that the “majority of prosecutors . . . desire to
see that justice is done rather than to add another conviction to their
record.”22 But attributing the misconduct to only a few bad apples was
probably a naïve claim, even in 1987. Today, any criminal defense lawyer
who adopts such a trusting approach does so at his or her client’s peril. In
my own experience, the majority of prosecutors routinely make improper
arguments to the jury—indeed, prosecutorial misconduct in closing
argument seems to be the rule rather than the exception. Moreover, some
forms of improper argument are deployed with such frequency, and by so
many different prosecutors, that there is reason to speculate that such
arguments may be a part of the prosecutors’ training. And much of the
empirical evidence on the pervasiveness of such misconduct supports this
17. Bowman, supra note 2, at 344 (emphasis added) (citing Ryan Patrick Alford,
Catalyzing More Adequate Federal Habeas Review of Summation Misconduct: Persuasion
Theory and the Sixth Amendment Right to an Unbiased Jury, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 479, 518
(2006)).
18. See Welsh White, Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct in Capital Cases: Imposing
Prohibitions on Improper Penalty Trial Arguments, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1147, 1149
(2002) (“[I]n most cases, the prosecutor’s final closing argument will be the last words that
the . . . jury hears from either attorney.”).
19. See Gagnon, supra note 8, at 474.
20. Bowman, supra note 2, at 343 (quoting H. Mitchell Caldwell et al., The Art and
Architecture of Closing Argument, 76 TUL. L. REV. 961, 972 (2002)).
21. Frank D. Celebrezze, Prosecutorial Misconduct: Quelling the Tide of Improper
Comment to the Jury, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 237, 238 (1987).
22. Id. at 247.
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anecdotal evidence. 23 Therefore, the well-prepared criminal defense lawyer
must enter each jury trial expecting the prosecutor to strike “foul blows.”24
The reason for this miserable state of affairs is twofold. First, prosecutors
know they are likely to get away with this form of misbehavior, as
“misconduct in jury argument proves to be one of the most difficult
problems to address for criminal defense counsel.”25 This is because
defense lawyers are unable to recognize many forms of improper argument
and, even when they do, the misconduct typically happens too quickly to
mount a thoughtful and effective response. 26
And second, appellate courts have proven to be highly tolerant of this
form of prosecutorial misconduct. For example, in Briggs v. State, the
defendant’s appellate lawyer argued that the Florida Court of Appeals had
repeatedly warned prosecutors that a particular type of argument was
unethical and constituted misconduct. 27 As such, the lawyer asked the court
to make good on its seven previous warnings to prosecutors and order a
new trial—one where the defendant Briggs could be tried free of improper
argument. 28
The court’s response to the lawyer’s request was the same as its response
in the previous seven cases cited by the appellate lawyer: “If [the improper
argument] continues, the appellate courts will be compelled, as appellant’s
counsel argues, to fashion a special remedy and reverse convictions so
obtained to provide an effective means of deterring further misconduct.” 29
Despite this further admonishment, however, the court again failed to act in
a meaningful way to protect Briggs (and other future defendants) from
23. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 2, at 332 (discussing an empirical study
demonstrating pervasive prosecutorial misconduct in California criminal trials); Paul J.
Spiegelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of Intent in Appellate
Review, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 120 (1999) (discussing evidence of “‘prosecutorial
recidivism’—the tendency of the same prosecutor or office to engage in misconduct
repeatedly, even in the face of admonishments from the court”).
24. Bowman, supra note 2, at 312 (citing the landmark case of Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78 (1935), noting the “striking gap” between “the strong rhetoric of Berger and . . .
the realities of prosecutors’ behavior,” and explaining how Berger’s condemnation of
prosecutorial misconduct is “routinely cited but largely ignored”).
25. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 214.
26. See Michael D. Cicchini, Prosecutorial Misconduct at Trial: A New Perspective
Rooted in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 340-42 (2007)
(discussing the challenges facing defense lawyers when attempting to deal with trial
misconduct generally).
27. Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519, 521–22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
28. Id. at 522.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
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prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecutors do not fear such tired judicial
mantras, though, as evidenced the court’s own admission that “for over 30
years such prosecutorial tactics have been disapproved of, yet they continue
to occur.”30 In the absence of meaningful action to prevent such
misconduct, prosecutors have accurately interpreted the court’s eighth
warning as yet another idle threat in a very long line of idle threats.
A California appellate court dealt with prosecutorial misconduct by using
similarly empty warnings. After repeated incidents of misconduct by the
same prosecutor in several cases, the court bemoaned:
[I]t is disheartening, to say the least, to learn that [the prosecutor]
takes ‘pride’ in our admonitions, apparently because we did not
reverse the judgment rendered. We most earnestly urge counsel
to reconsider her approach lest in the future it becomes necessary
for us to reverse otherwise sustainable convictions . . ..31
The problem for California defendants, however, is the same as that faced
by Florida defendants: the future never comes.
For many decades, other courts throughout the country have dealt
similarly with the problem of prosecutorial misconduct, issuing myriad
warnings to prosecutors to stop making improper closing arguments. 32
However, as in Florida and California, these judicial threats are nearly
always empty and free of consequence for the offending prosecutors.
While most appellate judges timidly ask prosecutors to abide by the rules
of ethics and trial procedure, one judge has recognized that this “attitude of
helpless piety is, I think, undesirable.”33 Such an attitude is indeed
“undesirable” for three reasons. First, it demonstrates that appellate courts
are unable to control the prosecutorial monster they have helped create, thus
exposing the courts’ ineffectiveness (or, at bare minimum, unwillingness)
to put an end to the conduct. Second, and more significantly, such “helpless
piety” does nothing for the defendants who were victimized by the

30. Id.
31. People v. Congious, No. B0202709 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1987) (emphasis added),
quoted in Cicchini, supra note 26, at 348.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1978) (“Unfortunately,
such improprieties are not rare grounds for appeal in this Circuit, and neither are our . . .
cautions to the government in such cases.”) (examining numerous cases involving improper
arguments).
33. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank,
J., dissenting).
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prosecutor’s misconduct. And third, it certainly does nothing to prevent the
victimization of future defendants.
Given the current state of affairs, what, if anything, can criminal defense
lawyers do at the trial-court level to protect their clients? Rather than
waiting until closing statements to react to improper arguments made by the
prosecutor, defense lawyers should take preemptive measures in order to
effectively battle this form of misconduct—one that, all too often, has come
to be expected.34
II. Recognizing Improper Arguments
Battling prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument begins with
learning what constitutes an improper argument. Part I of this Article set
forth the bounds of a legally proper argument. 35 In theory, then, anything
outside of those bounds is improper. But such a formulation is not easily
applied in practice. Therefore, the following sections provide concrete
examples of improper arguments grouped into general categories, the goal
of which is to make it easier for the criminal defense lawyer to recognize
prosecutorial misconduct when he or she hears it at trial.
It is important, however, to keep three things in mind. First, this Article
makes no attempt to list all examples—or even to identify all categories—
of improper argument. The variations of misconduct in closing arguments
are far too numerous to be easily catalogued in a single article. Second,
while there is broad agreement across jurisdictions as to what constitutes an
improper argument, the determination sometimes depends on the law of the
specific federal circuit, state, or federal district within a state. And third, for
some types of prosecutorial argument, what qualifies as improper may
depend upon the facts of the particular case. 36
Given this, every defense lawyer must become familiar with the law
applicable to his or her case and, equally important, must understand how
that law applies to different factual scenarios. Keeping these caveats in
mind, what follow are examples of common—but often improper—closing
arguments.

34. See infra Part III.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
36. For a single case that highlights the importance of a facts-and-circumstances
analysis and also demonstrates differences between the law of two jurisdictions, see
Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1254-56 (7th Cir. 1992).
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A. Testifying: You’re Damned if You Do
As late as the 1960s, some prosecutors were able to win convictions by
preventing defendants from testifying at trial.37 Today, however, courts
recognize a defendant’s constitutional right to testify in his or her own
defense.38 And to ensure this right has real meaning, courts often instruct
juries that “you should not discredit the testimony just because the
defendant is charged with a crime.”39 Yet prosecutors have developed
arguments to accomplish exactly what the law prohibits: they urge juries to
disregard the defendant’s testimony simply because he or she is the
defendant. For example, one prosecutor argued to the jury:
“[W]hat’s her interest, bias or prejudice? Well, she’s the
Defendant here, she stands a chance of getting convicted. That’s
one very large reason she should have of trying to slant her
testimony, of trying to shift the blame away. It’s not pleasant to
be convicted, especially at her age.”40
In a different case, the prosecutor similarly argued:
“[W]hat is his interest, bias or prejudice? Well, he’s the one on
trial here. You recall his testimony. He’s a 17 year old male
attending [high school], getting ready to enter into adulthood. Do
you think he’d want to go through the rest of his life with a
conviction[?]”41
In both cases, the Illinois court held that this type of argument was
improper as it “implied that the defendant lied simply because of his [or

37. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 571 (1961) (“In this case, a jury . . .
convicted the appellant of murder, and he is under sentence of death. After the State rested
its case at the trial, the appellant’s counsel called him to the stand, but the trial judge
sustained the State’s objection to counsel’s attempt to question him.”).
38. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987) (finding that a “rule excluding
all posthypnosis testimony infringers impermissibly on the right of a defendant to testify on
his own behalf”); see also Timothy P. O’Neill, Vindicating the Defendant’s Constitutional
Right to Testify at a Criminal Trial: The Need for an On-the-Record Waiver, 51 U. PITT. L.
REV. 809, 809 (1990) (“[T]he Supreme Court has directly held that a criminal defendant has
a constitutional right to testify at her trial.”).
39. WIS. J.I. CRIM. 300 (2016) (emphasis added).
40. People v. Crowder, 607 N.E.2d 277, 280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
41. People v. Watts, 588 N.E.2d 405, 407 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). Apparently, age is a nowin factor for a defendant; whether young or old, the prosecutor will spin it into evidence of
perjury.
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her] status as a defendant.”42 In other words, arguing that a defendant’s
testimony should be discredited, dismissed, or ignored because he or she is
the defendant is, in substance, the equivalent of preventing him or her from
testifying in the first place—something the Supreme Court has already
deemed unconstitutional. 43 The prosecutor must not be allowed to
accomplish the same end by different means.
Worse yet, this prosecutorial argument violates an even more important
constitutional principle: the presumption of innocence. This can be
demonstrated in three simple but irrefutable steps. First, in any criminal
case involving the defendant’s testimony, the prosecutor takes the position
that the defendant is guilty, but the defendant testifies that he or she is
innocent. Second, to argue that the defendant is lying (or slanting his or her
testimony or shifting blame) because of his or her status as a defendant
necessarily implies that the defendant is guilty. That, after all, is the whole
point of the prosecutor’s argument. And third, to argue that a person is
guilty merely because he or she has been charged with a crime is blatantly
unconstitutional, as such arguments “diminish the defendant’s fundamental
right to the presumption of innocence.” 44
Whether based on the defendant’s right to testify or his or her right to a
presumption of innocence, arguments that the defendant’s testimony should
be disregarded based solely on his or her status as the defendant are
improper; defense counsel must be able to recognize when the prosecutor is
engaging in misconduct by making such arguments.
B. Testifying: You’re Damned if You Don’t
For a variety of reasons, many defendants choose to exercise their
constitutional right to remain silent at trial. “It is not every one who can
safely venture on the witness stand, though entirely innocent of the charge
against him.”45 And the law is clear: a defendant “has a right to a jury
instruction that his silence is not evidence of his guilt.” 46 Yet, in cases
where defendants elect to remain silent, prosecutors are quick to spin this
42. Id.; cf. People v. Armstrong, 655 N.E.2d 1203, 1205-06 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“We
respectfully disagree with our esteemed colleagues [who decided Crowder and Watts]. . . .
Surely the fact that the defendants were charged . . . constituted a bias affecting the
credibility of these defendants.”).
43. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
44. Crowder, 607 N.E.2d at 280.
45. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965).
46. Sharon R. Gromer, Fifth Amendment—The Right to a No “Adverse Inference” Jury
Instruction, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1307, 1307 (1981).
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silence to the government’s advantage.47 Modern prosecutors normally do
not explicitly argue that a defendant’s silence at trial means that he or she is
guilty. Such a bold claim would be a blatant (but not necessarily reversible)
error.48 Instead, prosecutors “seem to keep coming up with arguments
which can have a double meaning,”49 thus maintaining the thrust of the
message, while at the same time giving the abusive prosecutors plausible—
or in many cases, implausible—deniability.
Improper comments on the defendant’s decision not to testify appear in
seemingly infinite variety. In one recent case, a prosecutor began rebuttal
argument “by walking across the court room, facing Defendant, and
declaring in a loud voice, while raising both arms to point at and gesture
toward Defendant, ‘Just tell us where you were! That’s all we are asking,
Noura!’”50
In a more subtle example, another prosecutor argued to a jury that “God
forbid you should believe a police officer whose testimony went
uncontradicted by these Defendants.”51 Similarly, another prosecutor
argued that there were only two people present for an alleged sexual
assault, and the “rape victim was the only person to have testified
concerning events occurring in the room where . . . [the] defendant had
raped her.”52
In perhaps the height of craftiness, another prosecutor argued to the
jurors that they “should not take into consideration in any way the fact that
[the] defendant did not testify,” which the court held was a disguised but
47. This Article addresses only improper arguments regarding the defendant’s decision
to remain silent at trial. It does not address pretrial silence, the admissibility of which could
turn on whether the defendant testifies at trial and whether the pre-trial silence occurred
before or after Miranda warnings. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda: How
Seibert and Patane Failed to “Save” Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 645, 647 (2006)
(discussing the admissibility of pre-Miranda silence).
48. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 230-31 n.98 (discussing the Court’s use of the
“harmless error” test as a way to uphold convictions despite prosecutorial comments on the
defendant’s silence).
49. Spry v. State, 664 So. 2d 41, 41-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
50. State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 585 (Tenn. 2014) (finding argument improper
and reversible error).
51. Knight v. State, 672 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added)
(finding argument improper and reversible error).
52. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 232 (emphasis added) (discussing Bailey v. State, 697
S.W.2d 110 (Ark. 1985) (finding argument improper and reversible error)); see also
Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1254 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding argument improper and
reversible error because the defendant was the only person who could have rebutted the
state’s evidence).
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“deliberate attempt to call attention to defendant’s failure to testify.” 53
Regardless of the form of the argument, however, any direct, indirect, or
even disguised comment on the defendant’s silence violates the defendant’s
due process rights and the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination and are therefore improper.
C. Liar, Liar (and other Name Calling)
Prosecutors sometimes argue that defendants are not believable simply
because they are charged with a crime. Other times, however, prosecutors
are more direct and simply call the defendant (or other defense witness) a
liar or brand the person with equally harmful labels.
In some jurisdictions, calling the defendant a liar is, at least in theory,
per se improper as it is considered an inflammatory label. 54 In other
jurisdictions, prosecutors may get away with such name-calling if it is
closely tied to evidence adduced at trial. For example, when “the witness
told four different stories” when testifying, it may be proper to discuss
those conflicting stories and then argue that the witness is “the biggest liar
in [the] [c]ounty.”55 That is, it may be permissible “to call the defendant or
a witness a ‘liar’ if conflicts in evidence make such an assertion a fair
inference.”56
Prosecutors are often creative and build upon the words “lie” or “lying”
or “liar.” One prosecutor went well beyond the pale in closing argument
when discussing the defendant’s testimony:
Joseph Goebbels, who was a propaganda minister for Germany
back at the time of Adolf Hitler, had a theory. He believed that
you should lie to the people but that you shouldn’t lie with small
lies because you can get caught in small lies. What you should
do is you should lie big, come up with a big lie because that’s
something that you might be able to have the people buy is the
big lie. Of course, at that time it was that the Jews were
53. Spiegelman, supra note 23, at 138 n.89 (discussing United States v. Roberts, 119
F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding argument improper and, when combined with other
errors, reversible error)).
54. See Gagnon, supra note 8, at 483-84 (discussing how Iowa’s supposed “bright line
test” is “not all that bright”); see also O’Callaghan v. State, 429 So.2d 691, 696 (Fla. 1983)
(stating that it is “unquestionably improper” to call the defendant a liar).
55. Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 914 (11th Cir. 2001).
56. People v. Starks, 451 N.E.2d 1298, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); see also Craig v.
State, 510 So. 2d 857, 865 (Fla. 1987) (finding that the prosecutor may call defendant a liar
if supported by the trial evidence).
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responsible for everything that was wrong in the world and they
should be exterminated. Well, the defense in this case is nothing
but a big lie. 57
Most prosecutors aren’t brash enough to invoke Nazi Germany and then
strain to find a way to associate the defendant with it. Many prosecutors
will, however, brand the defendant with other negative labels in addition to
that of liar. Depending on the facts of the case and the nature of the
prosecutor’s argument, name-calling such as “dope pusher,”58 “hoodlum,” 59
and “unpredictable animal”60 could very well be considered inflammatory,
improper, and even reversible error.
D. Disparaging the Defense Lawyer
When prosecutors aren’t criticizing the defendant or the defendant’s
witnesses, they are often disparaging the defendant’s lawyer. This type of
argument is improper because it “can prejudice the defendant by . . .
inducing the jury to give greater weight to the government’s view of the
case.”61
Attacks on defense counsel can take several forms, beginning with
criticism disguised as compliment. For example, in a classic case of false
flattery, one prosecutor “backhandedly compliment[ed] defense counsel on
his skill in confusing the alleged victim of a sexual assault when crossexamining her,” and then distinguished the dishonorable goals of the
defense lawyer from the noble objectives of “the government and the
judge.”62 More commonly, prosecutors go after defense counsel via a “more
direct” route. 63 Instead of arguing about the evidence, many prosecutors
have attacked “the personal integrity of defense counsel by suggesting that
counsel was not being truthful.”64 Not mincing words, one prosecutor told

57. Washington v. State, 687 So. 2d 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
58. Mays v. State, 571 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Ark. 1978).
59. Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 1969).
60. State v. McGregor, 244 So. 2d 846, 846 (La. 1971).
61. United States v. Xiong, 262 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001).
62. Spiegelman, supra note 23, at 136 n.83 (discussing United States v. Frederick, 78
F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding argument improper and, when combined with other
errors, reversible error)).
63. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 246 (discussing indirect and direct attacks on defense
counsel by the prosecutor).
64. Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519, 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (finding argument
improper but also harmless error).
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the jury that the defense lawyer “is either confused or she’s lying or trying
to mislead you.”65
Such misconduct in closing argument “evidences an excessive
preoccupation with obtaining a conviction at any cost.”66 And when
prosecutors employ this strategy, “the state’s closing argument may cause
one to wonder who is on trial, the defendant or the defense counsel.” 67 In
perhaps the most extreme (and literal) example of putting the defense
lawyer on trial, one prosecutor in an incest case “suggested that defense
counsel was also guilty of incest.”68
Another variation on this anti-defense-lawyer theme does not attack the
defense lawyer as an individual, but instead attacks his or her role in the
criminal justice system. For example, one prosecutor argued that, while the
prosecutor’s job is to “determine whether I believe a person is guilty and
whether I think [the prosecution is] just,” the “defense counsel’s job is to
get his client off the hook. That’s his only job here, not to see justice is
done but to see that his client is acquitted.” 69 This common twist on this
form of improper argument allows prosecutors to kill two birds with one
stone: anointing themselves as justice-seekers while at the same time
branding defense lawyers as obfuscators.70
Prosecutors continue to make these and similar arguments even though
courts have repeatedly stated that such “disparaging remarks directed at
defense counsel are reprehensible.” 71 In a broader sense, such remarks also
“detract from the dignity of judicial proceedings.”72 As such, regardless of
the prosecutor’s angle, all forms of argument directed at defense counsel
should be considered improper.
65. State v. Lyles, 996 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (finding argument
improper but not preserved at the post-conviction level and not sufficient to reverse under
the higher standard of plain error).
66. Briggs, 455 So. 2d at 520.
67. Tobin, supra note 12, at 495.
68. See id. at 495-96 n.78; see also Douglass v. State, 184 So. 756, 757 (Fla. 1938).
69. State v. Mayo, 734 N.W.2d 115, 121 (Wis. 2007) (finding argument improper but
not properly preserved at trial and not sufficient to reverse under the ineffective assistance of
counsel standard, plain error standard, or interests of justice standard).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 909 F.2d 705, 708-09 (2d Cir. 1990) (arguing
that the role of the defense lawyer is to “try to get them off, perhaps even for high fees”);
Wilson v. State, 938 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (arguing that defense counsel
wishes “that you turn a guilty man free” and “he can wish that because he doesn’t have the
obligation to see that justice is done”); People v. Hunt, 242 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Mich. Ct. App.
1976) (arguing that “defense counsel’s job was ‘to get his man acquitted’”).
71. United States v. Xiong, 262 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001).
72. Id.
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E. Vouching and Personal Opinion
Vouching is likely the most common form of improper argument, but its
numerous variations can make it difficult to identify. In general, a
prosecutor vouches when he or she gives a personal opinion about the
defendant’s guilt or about a particular piece of evidence. 73 This can be
problematic, as “[r]esearch consistently shows that jurors inherently find
prosecutors to be more credible than defense counsel.”74 Therefore, “it is
improper . . . for a prosecutor to express a personal belief in the guilt of the
accused, or in the veracity of the state’s witnesses.” 75
Although it occurs with some frequency, “[m]ost courts conclude that it
is misconduct for prosecutors to make ‘I’ statements such as ‘I think’ or ‘I
believe.’”76 Some obvious examples of such blatant vouching include, “I
think the defendant is guilty,” or, “I believe the victim testified truthfully.”
Some courts will let prosecutors get away with vouching, however, if the “I
think” or “I believe” statements are properly disguised. Examples might
include, “I think the evidence in this case shows the defendant is guilty,” or
“I think the physical evidence proves the victim told the truth.” Therefore,
whether this type of argument is improper is depends on how the language
is parsed.77
In most cases, prosecutors express their personal opinion of the
defendant’s guilt indirectly by giving their opinion that the government’s
witnesses testified truthfully and therefore the jury should believe them.
Prosecutors indirectly vouch for many types of government witnesses, but
they most commonly do so for the police. That is, prosecutors make
“inappropriate attempt[s] to persuade the jury that the police officer’s
testimony should be believed simply because the witness is a police
officer.”78
While offering a personal opinion is, by itself, improper, many
prosecutors compound this offense by bolstering their opinions with
reference to matters outside of the record. One prosecutor, for example,
bolstered his personal opinion of the defendant’s guilt by explaining to the
jury, “I look up police reports. . . . I determine whether I believe a person is
73. See Bowman, supra note 2, at 321.
74. Id. at 322-23.
75. Tobin, supra note 12, at 503.
76. Bowman, supra note 2, at 321-22.
77. See Craig Lee Montz, Trial Objections from Beginning to End: The Handbook for
Civil and Criminal Trials, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 243, 307-08 (2002) (discussing cases where the
prosecutor’s personal opinions were permitted).
78. Cisneros v. State, 678 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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guilty and whether I think it’s just. I also have the discretion . . . to dismiss
the charges if I think they’re unjust, if they didn’t happen, if it’s not
provable.”79
While vouching for several police officers, another prosecutor argued
that the police witnesses must be believed because, before they can become
police officers, they “take oaths to follow the law and so do not ‘stick’
people with charges.”80 The prosecutor specifically argued that, during their
induction ceremonies, “Officer Gammon took an oath to uphold the laws”
and “Detective Arkins took the same oath.”81 Therefore, in order to acquit
the defendant, the prosecutor contended, the jurors would have to believe
these police witnesses consciously violated their oaths, as well as their
oaths at trial, and “lied on the stand.”82 Such vouching, especially when
based on facts not in evidence, constitutes misconduct by the prosecutor.
F. Prosecutor “Testimony”
When prosecutors aren’t vouching for the state’s witnesses or evidence,
they sometimes offer their own testimony, thus creating evidence out of
thin air. Although the law is clear that “counsel has no right to create
evidence or to misstate the facts”83 and that any “[a]rgument on matters not
in evidence is improper,”84 prosecutors often “testify” in closing argument
nonetheless.
The most egregious example of prosecutor testimony occurs when a
prosecutor argues facts that he or she knows to be false. For example, in
one case a prosecutor argued to the jury that the defendant “never denied
[committing] the crime until he got on the witness stand.” 85 This might have
been a proper argument had there been evidence at trial of the defendant’s
pre-arrest and pre-Miranda silence. But in this case, the prosecutor “knew
79. State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶ 16, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115 (alterations in
original).
80. United States v. Cornett, 232 F.3d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 2000).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 676 (Iowa 1993); see also United States v.
Donato, 99 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reversing in part for prosecutor misstating evidence);
United States v. Forlorma, 94 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996) (reversal for prosecutor’s repeated,
incorrect claims about the evidence); Bowman, supra note 2, at 323 (“For example,
prosecutors commit misconduct when they exaggerate what the testimony shows, including
forensic evidence.”).
84. State v. Neuser, 528 N.W.2d 49, 54 (Ct. App. Wis. 1995) (quoting State v. Albright,
298 N.W.2d 196, 203 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)).
85. State v. Weiss, 2008 WI App 72, ¶ 15, 312 Wis. 2d 382, 752 N.W.2d 372.
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better” because she had two different police reports detailing how the
defendant had denied committing the crime long before he took the witness
stand.86 The argument was therefore improper, as “[p]rosecutors may not
ask jurors to draw inferences that they know or should know are not true.”87
In other cases, prosecutors argue facts that might be true but prevent the
introduction of evidence proving or disproving the facts and deny defense
counsel the opportunity to challenge the facts by waiting to discuss them
until closing arguments. This tactic violates both due process and the right
of confrontation: “Testimony from a prosecutor is difficult enough to
overcome, but it is impossible for a defendant to test or counter a
prosecutor’s ‘testimony’ when the defendant is denied his right to confront
the prosecutor as a witness.”88
In one example of this tactic, a defendant testified he was out-of-town “at
the Luxor Hotel in Las Vegas at the time” in question. 89 Instead of
presenting contrary evidence at trial, the prosecutor waited until closing
argument and “testified” that he knew the defendant was not at the Luxor
because, the prosecutor said, “I was able to have members of my staff
telephone the Luxor,” thus implying that the defendant had lied. 90 In a
different case—one alleging child sexual assault—a prosecutor argued that,
because the defendant “had been sexually abused” herself as a child, she
was “more likely to have committed the alleged sexual assaults in this
case.”91 This prosecutorial testimony was a twist on the “battering parent
syndrome,” but “was improper . . . because it was unsupported by expert
testimony” at trial.92
The above examples are relatively easy for defense counsel to recognize.
Sometimes, however, prosecutors do a better job of disguising their factual
assertions as argument. For example, one prosecutor argued that the
defendant in a drug case was able to post his $10,000 bond because he
“could go out the next day and make $10,000 up on one transaction.” 93 This
was improper because, during the evidence portion of trial, the prosecutor
did not “even attempt to prove that [the defendant] had received any money

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
State v. Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, ¶ 38, 310 Wis. 2d 138, 754 N.W.2d 77.
Cicchini, supra note 26, at 353.
Id.
State v. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d 325, 335 (Wis. 1990).
Id. at 336.
United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1978).
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as a result of any [drug] deals”—not even the alleged delivery with which
the defendant was charged. 94
In another case, a defendant was charged with arson, and the government
had seized his clothing to test for gasoline. 95 Defense counsel properly
argued that the test came back negative, thus pointing to the defendant’s
innocence. The prosecutor, however, responded “by speculating that the
reason for that fact could be that the defendant had destroyed the clothes”
he wore when committing the crime. 96 The court held that such argument
“was improper because it suggests a course of conduct by the defendant . . .
for which there was no evidence.”97
In a closely related tactic, prosecutors may instead misuse a piece of
evidence that was presented at trial. One amazingly creative prosecutor, for
example, argued that a defense witness’s prior conviction—a conviction
admitted into evidence only to impeach that witness’s credibility 98—was
somehow evidence that the defendant was guilty of the crime for which he
was on trial.99 Regardless of whether the prosecutor is creating evidence out
of thin air or misusing real evidence that was introduced at trial, both forms
of argument are prejudicial and improper.
G. Misstating the Law
Applying the law to the facts of the case is proper argument; misstating
the law when doing so, however, is not. Prosecutors have misstated nearly
every imaginable legal standard, including the law of affirmative
defenses100 and of lesser-included crimes.101 But the height of sophistry can
be found in prosecutors’ misstatements of the burden of proof.
Prosecutors commonly attempt to lower the government’s burden of
proof, thus raising the odds of winning a conviction. For example, one
Washington prosecutor argued that the jury’s duty in reaching its verdict
was to “search for the truth.”102 The appellate court, however, rightly stated
that this argument “misstates the jury’s duty and sweeps aside the State’s
burden.”103 Or, as one federal court explained, “‘seeking the truth’ suggests
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. (emphasis added).
State v. Singh, 793 A.2d 226, 243 (Conn. 2002).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See FED. R. EVID. 609.
United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 1993).
See, e.g., State v. Bougneit, 294 N.W.2d 675 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
See, e.g., State v. Neuser, 528 N.W.2d 49 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
State v. Berube, 286 P.3d 402, 411 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
Id.
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determining whose version of events is more likely true, the government’s
or the defendant’s, and thereby intimates a preponderance of evidence
standard.”104
Similarly, a California prosecutor argued that the reasonable doubt
standard is one “you use every day in your lives when you make important
decisions, [including] decisions about whether you want to get married.” 105
The appellate court, however, held that such a statement “trivializes the
reasonable doubt standard.”106 Further, the “marriage example is also
misleading since the decision to marry is often based on a standard far less
than reasonable doubt, as reflected in statistics indicating 33 to 60 percent
of all marriages end in divorce.”107
To make matters worse, these misstatements of law are sometimes
incorporated into the trial judge’s instruction to the jury on reasonable
doubt. In Wisconsin, for example, the often-challenged pattern jury
instruction uses both the analogy to decision-making in the “important
affairs of life”108 and, worse yet, literally instructs the jury “not to search for
doubt” but instead to “search for the truth.”109 Regardless of whether the
prosecutor’s argument parrots the trial judge’s instruction, however,
arguments that falsely attempt to lower the burden of proof are still
improper. Returning to the previous examples from Washington, the
appellate court found the prosecutor’s argument to “search for the truth”
improper despite the court’s pattern jury instruction equating beyond a
reasonable doubt with “an abiding belief in the truth of the charge.” 110
Similarly, in California, the appellate court found the prosecutor’s argument
“equat[ing] proof beyond a reasonable doubt to everyday decision-making
in a juror’s life” improper despite the trial judge’s instruction to the jury to
do the same.111
104. United States v. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis
added).
105. People v. Nguyen, 40 Cal. App. 4th 28, 35 (1995).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. WIS. J.I. CRIM. 140 (2016).
109. Id. (emphasis added); see also Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Truth or
Doubt? An Empirical Test of Criminal Jury Instructions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139 (2016)
(demonstrating empirically that Wisconsin’s pattern jury instruction on the burden of proof
lowers the burden below the reasonable doubt standard and is the equivalent of giving no
burden of proof instruction whatsoever).
110. Cicchini & White, supra note 109, at 1147 n.34 (quoting State v. Pirtle, 904 P.2d
245, 261 (Wash. 1995)).
111. People v. Johnson, 119 Cal. App. 4th 976, 980 (2004).
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Prosecutors also seek to diminish the burden of proof by presenting the
jury with a false dichotomy: in order to find the defendant not guilty, you
“would have to find that [the state’s witnesses] are lying about the evidence
they presented to you . . . . It’s really that black and white.” 112 Of course,
such arguments suffer from two fatal flaws. First, “testimony may be in
direct conflict for reasons other than a witness’ intent to deceive,” the most
obvious of which, of course, is that a witness may merely be mistaken. 113
And second, such prosecutorial arguments actually sidestep the burden of
proof itself:
[I]t of course does not follow as a matter of law that in order to
acquit [the defendant] the jury had to believe that the agents had
lied. If the jurors believed that the agents probably were telling
the truth and that [the defendant] probably was lying . . . it would
have been proper to return a verdict of not guilty because the
evidence might not be sufficient to convict defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt. To tell the jurors that they had to choose
between the two stories was error.114
In other cases, instead of merely lowering the burden of proof,
prosecutors often try shifting it to the defendant—regardless of whether the
defendant presented evidence at trial. Just as prosecutors can spin a
defendant’s decision to testify or to remain silent into evidence of guilt, 115
so too can they spin the defendant’s entire defense. When the defendant
decides not to present any evidence and instead attacks the strength of the
government’s case, prosecutors have shifted the burden by asking the jury,
“How many witnesses did the defense put on for your consideration?” 116
Conversely, when the defendant decides to call witnesses, prosecutors have
shifted the burden by improperly arguing that “the defendant has the same
responsibility [as the government] and that is to present a compelling
case.”117
Finally, another prosecutorial twist simply asks the jury to dispense with
the burden of proof altogether, arguing that the “burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is a shield for the innocent . . . not a barrier to conviction

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

United States v. Cornett, 232 F.3d 570, 574 (7th Cir. 2000).
State v. Singh, 793 A.2d 226, 238 (Conn. 2002).
United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
See supra Sections II.A, II.B.
Adams v. State, 566 S.W.2d 387 (Ark. 1978).
United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir. 1997).
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for the guilty.”118 Therefore, the argument continues, because the jury
“knows” the defendant is guilty, it should automatically convict, even when
the prosecutor is, technically, unable to prove it. 119
H. Straw Men
When a prosecutor sets up a straw man, he or she makes an argument,
attributes that argument to defense counsel, and then demonstrates that the
argument is invalid. Thus, the prosecutor gives the impression that, because
he or she clearly won the debate, the jury should convict. The point that
often eludes the jury, however, is that the prosecutor was merely arguing
with him or herself.
A common version of a straw man argument tracks closely with the false
dichotomy prosecutors use to diminish the burden of proof. For example,
when a defendant argues that a police officer was mistaken in his or her
identification of the defendant as the perpetrator, prosecutors will often
distort the argument:
While defense attorneys try and say, well, we’re not saying the
police are lying; what else are they saying? There’s no other
reasonable explanation, and it kind of frustrates me knowing and
working in this field and knowing these officers; and you know
them now too. You know them. They work hard. They do a
tough job. They come in here to testify a lot of times. They work
long, long hours. You weigh their testimony against the
defendant’s.120
Fortunately, the appellate court saw through this argument: “[W]e cannot
ignore the prosecutor’s self-imposed frustration at his own . . . suggestion
that testifying police officers may have lied.”121 That is, defense counsel
never once suggested the officers were lying; rather, the prosecutor merely
created a straw man. But “[o]nce the prosecutor’s rhetorical straw man was
created . . . it had to be eliminated.” 122 And the prosecutor eliminated it by

118. Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 351 (2nd Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
119. This argument is especially compelling, but just as improper, in states like
Wisconsin where judges amazingly instruct juries “not to search for doubt” but instead “to
search for the truth.” WIS. J.I. CRIM. 140 (2016).
120. State v. Smith, 2003 WI App 234, ¶ 12, 268 Wis. 2d 138, 671 N.W.2d 854
(emphasis added).
121. Id. at 859 (emphasis added).
122. Id.
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referencing matters “not in the record” and by vouching “for the credibility
of the police witnesses”—both of which “prejudiced” the defendant. 123
When straw man arguments are made in the prosecutor’s first argument
to the jury, it is possible—though time consuming—for defense counsel to
simply expose this sophistry in his or her own closing argument. But when
the prosecutor sandbags defense counsel by making this improper argument
in rebuttal, then the trial judge may have to be called upon to cure the
prejudice.
I. Sweet Emotion
A prosecutor is not permitted to ask the jury to convict the defendant for
any reason other than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Nonetheless,
prosecutors often resort to improper emotional appeals to win convictions.
The countless examples of this type of prosecutorial misconduct make it
impossible to catalog them all here. There are, however, three types of
emotional arguments commonly made by prosecutors: invoking sympathy
for the alleged victim, instilling fear of the consequences for failing to
convict, and pandering to jurors’ biases and prejudices.
With regard to sympathy-based arguments, prosecutors often attempt to
win a conviction by pitting the alleged victim against the defendant. In one
case, “at the conclusion of the prosecutor’s closing argument, he urged the
jury to ‘show [the defendant] the same mercy shown to the victim on the
day of her death.’”124 In other cases, prosecutors will whip up even more
emotion by asking the jurors to step into the shoes of the alleged victim. For
example, one “prosecutor made an objectionable ‘golden rule’ argument
stating, ‘It’s a gun. It’s a real gun. It’s a gun with a laser on it. Just imagine
how terrifying this laser would be if it was on your chest?’”125
Equally dangerous is the prosecutorial argument that invokes fear in the
context of societal issues. That is, prosecutors often urge jurors to convict
because of what will happen to society if they acquit. For example, one
prosecutor urged the jury to convict the defendant of a drug crime not based
on evidence, but because “[d]rugs are corrupting our society. Drugs are

123. Id. at 860.
124. Tobin, supra note 12, at 501 (quoting Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 1201, 1206 (Fla.
1989)).
125. Montz, supra note 77, at 304 (quoting DeFreitas v. State, 701 So. 2d 593, 601 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
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destroying our children. You must consider the significance of what we are
talking about.”126
As the previous example demonstrated, children are an especially useful
tool for invoking fear in the jury. Another prosecutor argued that the jury
should convict not because there was evidence the defendant committed the
child-sex crime with which he was charged, but rather to prevent
hypothetical, future crimes: “I don’t know how many more small children
we are going to allow him to . . . .”127 Hitting even closer to home, another
prosecutor urged jurors to convict a defendant in order to “send ‘a message
to those folks’ who might want to molest [your] neighbors’ children, [your]
own children or grandchildren.” 128
Despite the effectiveness of using children to instill fear in a jury,
perhaps the most effective way to invoke fear is to argue that the jurors will
personally be put in harm’s way if they acquit the defendant. In a not-sosubtle example of this argument, one prosecutor told the jurors “that gun is
still out there. If you say not guilty, [the defendant] walks right out the
door, right behind you.”129
Finally, in addition to invoking sympathy and fear, prosecutors may also
improperly rely on deeply ingrained racial and class biases to win
convictions. For example, one prosecutor argued that a jury should convict
a Jamaican defendant because “what is happening . . . is that Jamaicans are
coming in, they’re taking over the retail sale of crack . . . . It’s a lucrative
trade. The money, the crack, the cocaine that is coming into the city is
being taken over by people just like [the defendant].”130 And, biases can run
in both directions. Another prosecutor improperly argued that, if the jury
failed to convict the defendant, “she was rich and would thumb her nose at
small Martin County and say, ‘Well, we really pulled one over [on] those
guys.’”131

126. Anthony Flores, You Can’t Say That, or Maybe You Can: An Analysis of Michigan
Prosecutor Closing Argument Law, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 273, 280 (2010)
(paraphrasing People v. Duncan, 260 N.W.2d 58, 62-63 n.6 (Mich. 1977)).
127. Magar v. State, 836 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Ark. App. 1992) (upholding denial of mistrial
request where defense counsel’s objection terminated the improper argument and trial judge
issued curative instruction).
128. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 244-45 (quoting King v. State, 877 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Ark.
1994)).
129. N. Mar. I. v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475, 486 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
130. United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
131. Tobin, supra note 12, at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ryan v.
State, 457 So. 2d 1084, 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
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J. Uninvited Response
Prosecutors often commit misconduct in their rebuttal closing, theorizing
that their improper arguments were invited by defense counsel and are
therefore justified. This “invited response” doctrine is grossly
misunderstood and frequently abused. First, in order for a prosecutor’s
otherwise improper argument to have any chance of finding safe haven as
an invited response, defense counsel must first have made his or her own
improper argument.132 Consider an example where, through crossexamination at trial, defense counsel established that the police never
questioned an eyewitness at the crime scene. Further, counsel established
that the police never tested the physical evidence that was collected from
the crime scene. Then, in closing argument, counsel argued that the police
conducted a shoddy investigation, the state’s evidence cannot be trusted,
and the evidence that was presented does not constitute proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
This is a proper defense argument.133 And while such an argument
certainly “invites” the prosecutor to respond by citing any trial evidence
that pointed to guilt, the prosecutor may not invoke the so-called (and
poorly-named) invited response doctrine to justify making an improper
argument. 134
Continuing with the above example, assuming there was no supporting
testimony at trial, the prosecutor may not argue to the jury (whether true or
not) that the police did not talk to the eyewitness because he or she was
afraid of the defendant and refused to cooperate. Similarly, the prosecutor
may not argue that the police did not send the physical evidence for testing
due to a six-month backlog at the crime lab. Such arguments invoke facts
not in evidence, are improper, and were certainly not invited by defense

132. See Bowman, supra note 2, at 372 (noting that the invited response doctrine is
applicable only “[i]f the prosecutor’s misconduct was provoked by defense counsel’s own
improper argument”) (citation omitted); Lyon, supra note 1, at 700 (“The prosecution may
not . . . invoke the doctrine in an ‘offensive’ fashion; that is, it cannot use invited response as
a springboard.”).
133. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 446 (1995) (“A common trial tactic of defense
lawyers is to discredit the caliber of the investigation or the decision to charge the
defendant.” (quoting Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 613 (10th Cir. 1986)).
134. See United States v. Severson, 3 F.3d 1005, 1014 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that
defense counsel’s argument that the witness was lying to get the benefit of his plea bargain
did not invite the prosecutor’s response that the witness was testifying truthfully because
“the government would not tolerate untruthful testimony”).
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counsel’s proper arguments that the evidence failed to establish proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, even in cases where defense counsel does first make an
improper argument, some jurisdictions hold that the prosecutor is not
allowed to hide in the weeds, say nothing, and then launch into his or her
own improper argument in rebuttal. Rather, the prosecutor may be required
to object to defense counsel’s improper argument and seek a curative
instruction from the court.135 And this makes sense: just as defense
counsel’s failure to object to improper argument generally waives the issue
of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, so too should the prosecutor’s
failure to object waive the issue of defense counsel’s improper argument for
purposes of invited response.
Third, even when the invited response doctrine does excuse a
prosecutor’s improper argument, the doctrine still has its limits. The
prosecutor’s argument must have been “a necessary and reasonable”
response to defense counsel’s improper argument. 136 Further, prosecutor
rebuttal arguments that implicate constitutional rights—such as a comment
on the defendant’s right to remain silent at trial—are even less likely to be
justified as an invited response. 137
Finally, even when the prosecutor makes otherwise proper arguments in
rebuttal, it is important to remember that the purpose of rebuttal is to
“respond to arguments of opposing counsel.” 138 Just because defense
counsel argued that the state did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
the prosecutor should not have license to cite matters not raised by defense
counsel merely because those matters point to the defendant’s guilt. If the
word “rebuttal” could be interpreted that broadly, it would lose all meaning.
Rather, the scope of rebuttal argument should be much narrower: “rebuttal
shall be limited to matters raised by any adverse party in argument.” 139

135. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 13 (1985) (holding that the prosecutor’s
argument was not justified by invited response doctrine as “the prosecutor at the close of
defense summation should have objected to the defense counsel’s improper statements with
a request that the court give a timely warning and curative instruction to the jury”).
136. William Timothy Allen, III, Comment, The Paradox of the Prosecutor: Justice
Versus Conviction During Closing Argument, 34 LA. L. REV. 746, 758 (1974) (internal
quotations omitted).
137. Id.
138. Bowman, supra note 2, at 320.
139. WIS. STAT. § 805.10 (2017).
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Consequently, any rebuttal that goes beyond the specific arguments or facts
raised by defense counsel should be considered improper sandbagging. 140
III. The Reactionary Approach
Having identified several categories and examples of improper argument,
the next question is: What does the criminal defense lawyer do about it?
Following the conventional approach, most lawyers simply wait until the
prosecutor commits the misconduct and then react to it. Under this
approach, defense counsel must “contemporaneously object” to the
misconduct, which then “gives the trial court the first opportunity to correct
potential injustice by invoking an immediate cure and forestalling future
harm.”141 Most jurisdictions follow the “fundamental rule” that relief “will
not be considered in the absence of an appropriate objection in the trial
court.”142 Unfortunately, objecting to prosecutorial misconduct, while a
necessary step under the conventional approach, can be difficult and risky.
And once the defense lawyer objects, the objection, by itself, is rarely
sufficient.
A. The Decision to Object
To begin, even if defense counsel goes into a jury trial familiar with most
types of improper argument, objecting in the heat of battle is not easy.
When under the stress of the situation, it is often “difficult for defense
counsel to quickly identify the problem and raise an objection in seconds at
trial. Even if defense counsel is troubled by the prosecutor’s comments,
these conditions make it difficult for defense counsel to articulate their
objections quickly.”143
Even if the defense lawyer quickly identifies an improper argument and
is capable of articulating the appropriate objection, this does not necessarily
mean that he or she should object. “Deciding whether to object during
closing argument is one of the most difficult strategic decisions counsel
faces during trial.”144 Objecting can be costly.

140. See, e.g., Grassmyer v. State, 429 N.E.2d 248 (Ind. 1981) (holding that a prosecutor
may argue in “greater detail” about a topic raised by defense counsel, but that sandbagging is
not proper).
141. United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1013 (1st Cir. 1997).
142. Wicks v. State, 606 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Ark. 1980).
143. Bowman, supra note 2, at 356 (footnote omitted).
144. R. GEORGE BURNETT ET AL., WISCONSIN TRIAL PRACTICE § 9.64 (2001).
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[T]he conventional wisdom within the field of trial advocacy is
that attorneys should not object during closing arguments unless
things are terrible. . . . [C]ounsel may be concerned about
irritating the judge or jury by interrupting opposing counsel,
which can heighten jurors’ general tendencies to favor
prosecutors over defense counsel. More specifically, defense
counsel may be concerned about the jury’s likely reaction if her
objection is overruled. A trial court decision to overrule an
objection . . . may actually encourage the jury to rely on those
comments.145
Further, trial judges typically overrule objections, often because they do not
know the law or may not even be listening to the arguments. And while it
would be logical for defense counsel to think that his or her job is done
when an objection is overruled, the defense lawyer may actually be on the
hook for the trial judge’s error.
In one case, for example, even though the trial court overruled defense
counsel’s objection to improper argument, an appellate court “summarily
dismissed the defendant’s appeal, holding that the issue was waived
because defense counsel failed to move for a mistrial.”146 Of course, the
appellate court did not say how the trial judge could have granted a mistrial
(or awarded any other remedy) after overruling the underlying objection.
Fortunately, many jurisdictions follow the far more rational approach that,
“[i]f the trial court overrules the objection, no further step should be
required of defense counsel . . . because the trial court has [already] ruled
that no misconduct has occurred.”147
In other cases—particularly where the trial judge does not understand the
law or was not listening to the arguments—the judge may refuse to sustain
or overrule defense counsel’s objection. Instead, he or she may simply utter
145. Bowman, supra note 2, at 358 (footnote omitted) (internal quotations omitted). The
defense lawyer’s concern about drawing further attention to objectionable information is
legitimate and supported by empirical evidence. See Shari S. Diamond et al., The “Kettleful
of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 1537, 1592 (2012) (discussing and citing an empirical study on the effect of an
overruled objection).
146. Cicchini, supra note 26, at 355 (footnote omitted).
147. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 256; see also State v. Cockrell, 741 N.W.2d 267, 274, n.
14 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]hen the court sustains the objection, without a request for a
mistrial all [the court] can assume is that the defendant was satisfied with the court’s ruling
and curative measure, and that he had no further objections. This rationale does not apply
when the court has overruled the objection, as it did here.”) (citations and internal quotations
omitted).
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a general-purpose platitude, such as, “I’m not going to talk about this. I’m
going to let the jury decide this case on the instructions I’ve given you.” 148
Similarly, the judge may utter the true but meaningless statement that
closing arguments “are not the evidence.” 149
And just as defense lawyers may be on the hook when the trial judge
erroneously overrules an objection, so too can defense counsel be blamed
when the trial judge neglects to formally rule on the objection and instead
skirts the issue with platitudes and truisms. One appellate court held that
because the defense lawyer “did not pursue the matter and thus failed to get
a ruling on his objection . . . [h]e may not now pursue the matter on
appeal.”150 Of course, the appellate court did not explain how the defense
lawyer would have been able to demand—in the middle of arguments and
in front of the jury—that the judge do his or her job and rule on the
objection. Fortunately, some jurisdictions again follow a more rational
approach, finding that “[i]f there is no ruling [by the trial judge], counsel
should consider the objection overruled.”151
Worse yet, even winning the battle could mean losing the war when it
comes to objecting to a prosecutor’s closing argument: “[T]he defense
attorney’s [objection], even if sustained by the court, may have exactly the
opposite effect from the one intended. It may call attention to the
prosecutor’s improper remarks and reemphasize them in the jurors’
minds.”152
B. The Problem of Remedies
Even in the case where everything goes right—that is, defense counsel
recognizes the improper argument and quickly objects, and the judge
sustains the objection—the defense lawyer’s job has just begun. “[I]f trial
counsel fails to move for additional relief, the action of the trial court in
sustaining the objection will result in counsel obtaining all relief
requested.”153 However, a sustained objection, by itself, usually will not be
sufficient relief. At best, it may terminate the improper argument before the
148. Dunlap v. State, 728 S.W.2d 155, 162 (Ark. 1987).
149. Jordan v. Hepp, 831 F.3d 837, 849 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that generic instruction
that arguments “are not the evidence” was insufficient, as it did not “identify the
prosecutor’s remarks as improper statements that should be disregarded” and was not “given
contemporaneously with, or immediately after, the prosecutor’s inappropriate comments”).
150. Dunlap, 728 S.W.2d at 162.
151. BURNETT ET AL., supra note 144, § 6.29.
152. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 649.
153. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 250-51.
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jury feels its full impact.154 But a sustained objection does nothing more. It
is not even clear how a jury would interpret the judge’s ruling of
“sustained.” Is the prosecutor’s argument sustained? Or is the objection
sustained? And if the objection is sustained, what is the jury to think or do?
Given the inadequacy of a sustained objection, defense counsel must
request an appropriate remedy. Curative instructions from the judge to the
jury155 and mistrial declarations156 represent the two most common
remedies for improper arguments. Other possible remedies include
permitting defense counsel to present a rebuttal argument or even reopening
the case to permit rebuttal evidence. However, these alternatives are “not
generally considered by trial judges”157 and are therefore not addressed in
this Article.
1. Curative Instructions
For many types of improper arguments, a curative instruction is
potentially helpful. For example, assume a prosecutor misstates the burden
of proof by arguing that, because the state’s evidence is more believable
than the defendant’s, the jury must convict. In this case, a curative
instruction from the court may eliminate any prejudice. Such an instruction
could remind jurors that the burden of proof is not the preponderance of
evidence, and that “[i]f the jury has a reasonable doubt, then it must find the
defendant not guilty even if it thinks that the charge is probably true.”158
However, even assuming the trial judge was paying attention to the
prosecutor’s argument and is also well-educated on the law, devising an
effective curative instruction on the spot in the middle of closing arguments
is not an easy task. Thus, when trial judges sustain objections, they

154. See Hepp, 831 F.3d at 849.
155. See, e.g., State v. Rockette, 2006 WI App 103, 294 Wis. 2d 611, 718 N.W.2d 269
(upholding conviction because the trial judge “issued a curative instruction to the jury” after
the prosecutor’s improper argument).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1016 (1st Cir. 1997) (vacating
conviction for trial court’s failure to declare a mistrial).
157. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 252-53 (arguing that because a mistrial often places a high
burden on the defendant rather than on the offending prosecutor, the trial court should
consider “a range of corrective measures” including allowing defense counsel to present
rebuttal evidence or argument).
158. VT. MODEL CRIM. J.I., at CR04-101 (2005) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Giroux,
531 A.2d 403, 406 (Vt. 1989)).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss4/4

2018]

MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING ARGUMENTS

917

typically resort to the generic mantra that “the words of the attorneys . . .
are not evidence and must not be considered by you as evidence.” 159
But this type of curative instruction doesn’t actually cure anything.
Rather, there are at least three problems with it. First, the instruction lumps
both attorneys together, even though it was the prosecutor, not the defense
lawyer, who committed the misconduct. Second, the instruction does
nothing to “identify the prosecutor’s remarks as improper statements that
should be disregarded.”160 And third, telling the jury that arguments are not
evidence completely misses the point because “[t]he issue was not the
introduction of improper evidence, but rather the impact of improper
argument.”161
Even a good curative instruction is not always sufficient; some types of
improper argument “may be too clearly prejudicial” for even a well-crafted
“curative instruction to mitigate their effect.” 162 For example, when a
prosecutor argues, directly or indirectly, that the defendant’s failure to
testify is evidence of guilt, any curative instruction would “likely serve[] to
emphasize” the improper argument rather than mitigate it. 163 Similarly,
when the prosecutor inflames the jury’s passions by arguing that, if they fail
to convict, the defendant could victimize them or their families, 164 even the
best curative instruction cannot un-ring the bell.
2. Mistrial
In cases where a curative instruction is of little or no value, defense
counsel can alternatively request a mistrial. But “[w]hether to grant a
mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.”165 One mistrial
framework, for example, requires the trial judge to assess the impact of the
prosecutor’s improper argument on the trial as a whole by weighing the
following factors:

159. Jordan v. Hepp, 831 F.3d 837, 849 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that this generic
instruction was not sufficient to cure the prejudice).
160. Id.
161. Cicchini, supra note 26, at 352.
162. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 644 (1974).
163. State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 592 (Tenn. 2014) (holding improper argument
not curable with an instruction).
164. See, e.g., N. Mar. I. v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475, 486 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding
prejudicial error based on the prosecutor’s argument that “[T]hat gun is still out there. If you
say not guilty, he walks right out the door, right behind you”).
165. State v. Sigarroa, 2004 WI App 16, ¶ 24, 269 Wis. 2d 234, 674 N.W.2d 894.
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1) the nature and seriousness of the prosecutorial misconduct; 2)
whether the prosecutor’s statements were invited by conduct of
defense counsel; 3) whether the trial court[’s curative]
instructions to the jury were adequate; 4) whether the defense
was able to counter the improper arguments through rebuttal;
and 5) the weight of the evidence against the defendant. 166
Under this particular test, the case for a mistrial will be strongest when, in a
relatively close trial, the prosecutor repeatedly made improper arguments,
particularly if they infringed constitutional rights such as due process, the
right against self-incrimination, or the right of confrontation. The case for a
mistrial will be strengthened if the prosecutor committed the misconduct in
rebuttal, particularly when the arguments were not invited by any improper
argument made by the defense counsel. The case will be strengthened even
further when the impact of the prosecutor’s misconduct cannot be mitigated
by a curative instruction or when the judge gives an instruction not
sufficiently tailored to the misconduct.
But even when a mistrial is granted, the typical prosecutor will simply
retry the defendant, often with a battle-tested and stronger case the second
time around. Whether a prosecutor can retry the defendant relies on a
common, if bizarre, test:
[T]he Supreme Court of the United States held that the
defendants’ double jeopardy protections only extend to cases
where the prosecutor’s misconduct was committed “in order to
goad the [defendant] into requesting a mistrial.” . . .
Under Kennedy, therefore, if the prosecutor merely intended
to harass the defendant, overreach, or obtain a conviction by
improper means, the prosecutor is rewarded by being able to
retry the defendant in a second trial or even in subsequent
trials.167
166. United States v. Cheska, 202 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Sigarroa, 674
N.W.2d at 903 (“The trial court must determine, in light of the whole proceeding, whether
the claimed error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.”).
167. Cicchini, supra note 26, at 357 (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673-75
(1982)). Some states may employ a differently worded, more favorable legal standard. See,
e.g., Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“Did the prosecutor
engage in that conduct with the intent to goad the defendant into requesting a mistrial
(Kennedy standard) or with conscious disregard for a substantial risk that the trial court
would be required to declare a mistrial (Bauder standard)?”); State v. Jenich, 288 N.W.2d
114, 122 (Wis. 1980) (“[I]f a defendant’s motion for mistrial is prompted by prosecutorial or
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This test presents a problem for defendants because it is nearly impossible
to satisfy, 168 which often has the perverse effect of encouraging, rather than
deterring, improper arguments. As a result, when prosecutors commit
misconduct in closing argument and a mistrial is granted, they are nearly
always rewarded with a do-over.169
Further, a retrial could be incredibly costly for a defendant in terms of
time, money, or both. When a defendant is paying for defense counsel’s
fees (as opposed to being represented by a public defender), the costs of a
second trial can be staggering and financially ruinous. When a defendant is
indigent and unable to post bail, he or she will likely remain in custody
pending the retrial, the practical result of which is that, in many cases, the
defendant essentially serves the sentence for the crime, even when the state
fails to win an actual conviction.170
For these reasons, a defendant might not want a mistrial, instead
preferring “to proceed with resolution of the case by the empaneled jury
rather than starting over with a new jury.” 171 In other words, although a
“[m]istrial is the only remedy certain to ensure that the prejudicial conduct
will not taint the ultimate verdict . . . its application may unfairly burden the
defendant.”172
To make matters even more complicated, courts vary as to when and
how defense counsel must request a mistrial. For example, at least one court
seems to require counsel to request a mistrial first, even though, if granted,
such a remedy could carry serious consequences for the defendant. Then,
“upon denial of mistrial, counsel may properly request an admonition to the

judicial misconduct which was intended ‘to provoke’ defendant’s motion or was otherwise
‘motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or prejudice’ the defendant or to ‘afford the
prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict’ the defendant, double jeopardy does
bar further prosecution.”).
168. See, e.g., Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 688 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“It is almost
inconceivable that a defendant could prove that the prosecutor’s deliberate misconduct was
motivated by an intent to provoke a mistrial instead of an intent simply to prejudice the
defendant.”) (footnote omitted).
169. See Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy:
Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 894-95 (1998).
170. Ironically, one judge believes that, even though it was the government’s
misconduct, not defense counsel’s, that caused the problem to begin with, appellate courts
are justified in their “unwillingness to impose on society the added expense of money and
resources involved in a retrial.” See Celebrezze, supra note 21, at 244-45.
171. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 252.
172. Id.
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jury.”173 And if counsel first requests an admonition to the jury, he or she
may be waiving the right to request a mistrial at a later time. 174
The more rational approach is to allow defense counsel to begin with less
extreme requests, such as a request for a curative instruction. Then, after
consultation with the client, and after considering the cumulative impact on
cases with multiple instances of improper argument, defense counsel may
additionally move for a mistrial before the jury returns its judgment. 175 If
counsel fails to do so, then the court will assume that he or she “was
satisfied with the court’s ruling and curative measure.” 176
C. The Risk of Not Objecting
As demonstrated above, the law governing objections, rulings, and
remedies is chaotic. Even under the best conditions, objecting to
prosecutorial misconduct can be meaningless, if not harmful, for the
defense. However, the risks of not objecting may be even greater.
To demonstrate this, assume that a prosecutor makes an improper closing
argument. To avoid drawing further attention to the argument, and to avoid
the risk that the judge will overrule an objection, defense counsel makes a
snap decision not to object. In this case, the defendant probably “waives the
right to appeal on that specific point because the trial judge [did] not have
an opportunity to offer a curative instruction and there is no record created
for appeal.”177
More specifically, when the defendant’s appellate lawyer later complains
of the improper argument, he or she will set in motion a rather bizarre legal
standard. Despite the prosecutor’s duty as a so-called “minister of
justice,”178 the improper argument will no longer be analyzed as
prosecutorial misconduct. Instead, all blame for the prosecutor’s unethical
behavior will be shifted to defense counsel under an ineffective assistance
of counsel framework. 179

173. Id. at 255.
174. Id.
175. See State v. Rockette, 2006 WI App 103, 294 Wis. 2d 611, 718 N.W.2d 269.
176. Id. at 278; see also Sullivan, supra note 3, at 228 (“The trial court sustained defense
counsel’s objection and admonished the jury to disregard the statements, and the court of
appeals noted that defense counsel had failed to request a stronger admonition or other
relief.”).
177. Flores, supra note 126, at 279.
178. See supra Part I.
179. See Jordan v. Hepp, 831 F.3d 837, 848 (7th Cir. 2016) (“In Jordan’s trial, [defense
counsel] failed to object to any of the prosecutor’s improper statements. Our first question is
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This is bad news for both the defense lawyer and the defendant. First,
and rather perversely, it is the defense lawyer who will be held to answer
for the prosecutor’s intentional misconduct. 180 As such, defense counsel
will have to explain his or her thought process behind the snap judgment
not to object to the improper argument. 181 Often, this explanation must be
given months or even years after the trial—long after defense counsel’s
memory of the prosecutor’s misconduct has faded.
Second, if defense counsel remembers his or her thought process behind
the decision not to object, the court will deem nearly any explanation to
have been a reasonable trial strategy, and the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim will fail.182 Conversely, if the defense lawyer cannot
remember the incident, and therefore cannot testify about the split-second
decision he or she made months or even years earlier, any error will likely
be deemed harmless.183 Either way, the probable result is the same: the
defendant loses and obtains no relief for the prosecutor’s unethical
behavior.
The news only gets worse from there for the defendant. In cases where
defense counsel decided not to object to the improper argument, the
defendant’s appellate lawyer may also choose to pursue an “interest of
justice,” “fundamental error,” or “plain error” type of argument when
challenging the prosecutor’s misconduct. One author framed the test this
way: “Without a proper and timely objection . . . reversal on appeal will
only occur if . . . the outcome at trial would have seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding.” 184 But this
conception doesn’t adequately describe the near impossibility of succeeding
under this legal standard, as many courts add an additional hurdle to plain
whether that failure rendered [defense counsel’s] performance ineffective under
Strickland.”).
180. See DeFreitas v. State, 701 So. 2d 593, 602 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“[D]efense
counsel has the duty to remain alert to [improper argument] in fulfilling his responsibility to
see that his client receives a fair trial. . . . [T]his court is not inclined to excuse counsel for
his failure in this regard.”).
181. See Jordan, 831 F.3d at 850 (“We instruct the district court to hold a hearing . . . to
allow the parties to present evidence about whether [defense counsel] had a strategic reason
for failing to object the prosecution’s improper vouching . . . .”).
182. See State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶ 63, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115, 131 (Wis.
2007) (“Defense counsel’s lack of objections on [numerous improper arguments] was found
by the circuit court to involve defense strategy, which this court will not now secondguess.”).
183. See id. at 130.
184. Flores, supra note 126, at 283.
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error review. When the defense lawyer “fail[s] to object to the remarks
when they were made, the plain error standard additionally requires that
[the defendant] ‘establish not only that the remarks denied him a fair trial,
but also that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different
absent the remarks.’”185
And yet, other appellate courts seem to imply that even unfairness
combined with harm is not enough. Because these courts are highly tolerant
of prosecutorial misconduct, “[p]lain error review is ordinarily limited to
‘blockbusters’ and does not ‘consider the ordinary backfires—whether or
not harmful to a litigant’s cause—which may mar a trial record.’” 186 And,
if we have learned anything thus far, it is that improper argument is so
common that it is “ordinary.” Courts, therefore, nearly always reject plain
error challenges. 187 The result, once again, is that the defendant obtains no
relief for the prosecutor’s misconduct.
IV. A Simple Plan
As demonstrated above, reacting to prosecutorial misconduct after the
fact via a contemporaneous objection is often ineffective. Therefore,
defense counsel should consider formulating a plan for dealing with
improper remarks long before the prosecutor utters them in closing
argument.
A. Plan Objectives
Defense counsel’s plan for dealing with improper closing arguments
should, ideally, accomplish several objectives. First, the plan should deter
the prosecutor from making improper arguments in the first place by
putting the prosecutor on the defensive. The plan should “have a chilling
effect on closing argument rhetoric,” and should make the prosecutor
“[f]earful of reprisal” for making improper arguments. 188

185. United States v. Anderson, 303 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
186. United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1014 (1st Cir. 1997) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
187. See Mayo, 734 N.W.2d at 119 (Wis. 2007) (“[A]lthough there was improper
prosecutorial argument . . . such misconduct did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to
constitute a denial of [the defendant’s] due process rights, thus warranting a new trial, either
as plain error or in the interest of justice.”); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 248 (discussing the
near impossibility of obtaining relief under the “doctrine of fundamental error which would
afford review of unpreserved error”).
188. Gagnon, supra note 8, at 485.
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Second, in the event the prosecutor is not deterred, the plan should
educate the trial judge by describing what the prosecutor is likely to argue
and explaining why such argument is improper. This way, the trial judge is
alert and engaged during closing arguments, making it more likely he or she
will recognize an improper argument in the first place—a prerequisite if the
defendant is to obtain any meaningful relief.
Third, the plan should adequately preserve the prosecutor’s misconduct
for meaningful judicial review during trial and, if necessary, at postconviction hearings and on appeal. Thus, the plan should prevent the
shifting of blame from the prosecutor to defense counsel (via the ineffective
assistance of counsel framework) and should prevent the courts from
sidestepping the issue by applying the plain error framework, which, as
noted above, is incredibly difficult to satisfy. Moreover, given the
demanding and potentially harmful nature of the normally required
contemporaneous objection, the plan should preserve the prosecutor’s
misconduct for judicial review without defense counsel having to object in
the middle of closing arguments.
Fourth, the plan should provide defense counsel and the trial court with
an opportunity to develop effective curative instructions for the prosecutor’s
misconduct. Just as it is difficult for defense counsel to identify improper
arguments and instantly formulate an objection in the heat of battle, so too
is it difficult for even a well-educated and attentive trial judge to craft a
meaningful curative instruction on the spot.
Fifth, in the event that curative instructions are not sufficient to cure the
prosecutor’s misconduct, the plan should give defense counsel the
opportunity to consult with the defendant before requesting the serious and
costly remedy of a mistrial. In cases with multiple improper arguments, it
should also give the trial judge the opportunity to assess the cumulative
impact of the misconduct before ruling on the mistrial motion.
Finally, in the event a mistrial is requested and declared, the plan should
lay a foundation for defense counsel to later argue that double jeopardy
protections prevent the state from re-prosecuting the defendant in a second
trial.
B. Pretrial Motion in Limine
In order to accomplish the above objectives, the battle must be won
before it is fought—that is, before closing arguments begin. A motion in
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limine, which is filed before trial and seeks an advanced ruling on an issue
likely to arise during the trial, can accomplish this goal. 189
Motions in limine promote trial efficiency, and their use has expanded in
recent years.190 Given the disruption caused at trial by prosecutorial
misconduct in closing arguments and the dearth of suitable remedies once
the misconduct occurs, the issue of “[i]mproper prosecutorial arguments” is
undoubtedly “appropriate for a motion in limine.” 191 More specifically, if
defense counsel “suspect[s] that the prosecutor intends to make improper
statements during closing argument, [defense counsel] should consider
filing a motion in limine before [trial] asking the trial judge to preclude the
prosecutor from making those arguments.”192 If this motion is granted, it
could solve the biggest problem facing defense counsel at trial: in many
jurisdictions, as long as “the motion alert[s] the trial court to the same issue
of fact or law that arises at trial,” then “the motion in limine relieves the
party from having to object.”193
This makes sense, of course, as the very purpose of raising the issue
before trial is to avoid having to object and draw more attention to the
improper argument during trial.194 To require an objection at trial to
something already raised in a motion in limine would put counsel “in a
classic ‘Catch 22’ position. By not objecting, [counsel] is held to waiver.
By objecting, [counsel] draws the jury’s attention to the very prejudicial
[argument] that the trial court had already ruled [improper].” 195 As one
court stated, because the purpose “of the contemporaneous objection rule is
fairness, we will not apply the rule to permit such an unfair dilemma.” 196
In jurisdictions where the motion in limine, if granted, serves as a legally
valid substitute for the contemporaneous objection, this approach should
also satisfy another objective: it preserves the prosecutor’s misconduct for
meaningful review at all levels including during post-conviction hearings
189. See Celebrezze, supra note 21, at 245 (“[D]efense counsel could offer a motion in
limine prior to closing argument if it is anticipated that the prosecutor is bent on making
improper remarks.”).
190. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 2003 WI App 252, 268 Wis. 2d 694, 673 N.W.2d 386.
191. L. MICHAEL TOBIN, WISCONSIN CRIMINAL DEFENSE MANUAL ch. 5, at 156 (5th ed.
2011) (citing numerous improper arguments and supporting case law).
192. 2 JULIE RAMSEUR LEWIS & J OHN RUBIN, NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDER MANUAL,
TRIAL § 33.7(C) (2d ed. 2012) (emphasis added).
193. State v. Bergeron, 470 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
194. See State v. English-Lancaster, 2002 WI App 74, ¶ 8, 252 Wis. 2d 388, 642 N.W.2d
627.
195. Id. at 631.
196. Id. (citation omitted).
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and on appeal. And the motion in limine will serve to focus the attention of
post-conviction counsel and the courts on the prosecutor’s misconduct,
rather than on the defense lawyer’s failure to properly react to the improper
arguments.
In order to accomplish the objectives related to remedies, however, the
motion in limine must go beyond merely asking the court to order the
prosecutor not to make certain types of improper arguments. Rather, the
motion must assume the prosecutor will violate the court’s order and should
therefore propose a course of action with regard to the two most common
remedies: curative instructions and a mistrial.
As previously discussed, many types of improper arguments can be
adequately addressed by curative instructions. In order to allow sufficient
time to draft instructions tailored to the specific prosecutorial offense,
though, the motion should request a hearing for that purpose outside the
jury’s presence. The hearing should be held after the prosecutor’s rebuttal
argument and before the court issues its final instructions to the jury. Then,
to allow defense counsel an opportunity to consult with the defendant
before requesting a mistrial, the motion should preserve the right to request
the mistrial until after the court’s final instructions to the jury and before
the jury returns its verdict.
Finally, in the event the court grants a mistrial motion, the previously
filed motion in limine may also help accomplish the final objective
discussed above: offering protection when the prosecutor attempts to retry
the defendant. Although highly state specific, the test for whether the
prosecutor may retry the defendant may hinge on whether the prosecutor
goaded defense counsel into requesting the mistrial.197 If so, then retrial is
barred. This high standard is a much easier to satisfy when defense counsel
previously put the prosecutor on notice via the motion in limine that
improper arguments would provoke a mistrial request.
C. Trial Procedure
After filing a motion in limine, defense counsel must also have a plan for
the trial itself. This requires researching the applicable procedural laws
including, for example, any timing requirements for requesting the
available remedies. At a minimum, defense counsel should be prepared for
the following three steps.

197. See supra Section III.B.2.
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1. Decide Whether to Object
In many jurisdictions, assuming the trial judge granted the motion in
limine before trial and the prosecutor violated the court’s order by making
an improper argument, no contemporaneous objection by defense counsel
should be required. There are still several scenarios, however, where
defense counsel will be required to object. First, when the trial judge denied
the motion as being premature, refused to rule on the motion, or responded
to the motion in a vague way—for example, by stating that the lawyers will
be expected to follow the rules during closing arguments—defense counsel
will be required to object to the prosecutor’s misconduct as it occurs. In this
case, the motion in limine will have failed to fulfill one of its objectives: to
relieve defense counsel of the duty to object in the middle of closing
arguments. Simply filing the motion in limine, however, will still
accomplish many other objectives.
Second, even if the judge granted the motion in limine, defense counsel
will still be held to the contemporaneous-objection rule when the prosecutor
makes an improper argument that was not identified in the motion. This is
so because the judge did not have the opportunity to order the prosecutor
not to commit that particular brand of misconduct. 198
Third, even when defense counsel has identified a particular type of
improper argument in the motion in limine and the judge granted the
motion, counsel may still want to object in cases where the objection might
terminate the argument before the prosecutor completes a full windup and
delivery. Therefore, the motion in limine should preserve counsel’s right to
object, even though the motion in limine relieves counsel of the obligation
to object.
2. Request a Post-argument Hearing
Assume, then, that the prosecutor makes an improper argument to the
jury, regardless of whether defense counsel (a) identified the issue in the
motion in limine, which the court granted; or (b) contemporaneously
objected at trial. The next step, after the state’s rebuttal argument, is to
quickly request a conference to be held outside the jury’s presence and
before the court gives its final instructions to the jury. At this conference,
198. This is, of course, absurd; imagine a defendant arguing that he should not be
prosecuted for, say, theft, because no one ever specifically told him not to commit that
particular crime. Nonetheless, this is why motions in limine should be worded broadly to
foreclose categories of improper argument, rather than highly specific versions of such
arguments.
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defense counsel should identify the prosecutor’s improper argument and
propose curative instructions to be included with the court’s final, predeliberation instructions. Curative instructions will vary dramatically based
on the prosecutor’s specific form of misconduct. 199
3. Consider a Mistrial Motion
Once the jury receives its final instructions (including any curative
instructions) and begins its deliberations, defense counsel must next discuss
with the defendant the possibility of a motion for a mistrial. The “[m]istrial
is the only remedy certain to ensure that the prejudicial conduct will not
taint the ultimate verdict”; obtaining this remedy, however, “may unfairly
burden the defendant.”200 During the discussion, defense counsel should
explain the possibility—or likelihood—of retrial as well as other
consequences including a lengthy delay, continued incarceration, additional
attorney’s fees and other trial expenses, and, most significantly, the
possibility of the state developing a stronger case for the second trial.
Not requesting a mistrial, however, also has consequences that defense
counsel should explain. Most significantly, the appellate court will likely
decide that the defendant was happy with merely receiving a sustained
objection and curative instruction, if any, and decided to roll the dice on the
verdict. Counsel should be sure to explain that, in this scenario, the
defendant’s post-conviction counsel may be forced to seek relief through
the difficult-to-satisfy plain-error framework.
Any mistrial motion should be tailored to the specific jurisdiction’s
multi-factor mistrial test. Additionally, to support any future motion that the
prosecutor should be barred from retrying the defendant, counsel may wish
to state that: (1) the prosecutor was put on notice via the pretrial motion in
limine—regardless of whether the court granted it—that a particular
argument was improper and would provoke a mistrial request; (2) the
prosecutor decided to make that improper argument despite such notice;
and (3) the prosecutor has therefore provoked defense counsel into
requesting a mistrial.201
D. Other Mistrial-Related Issues
With regard to mistrial motions, two highly jurisdiction-specific issues
arise that defense counsel should research, consider, and discuss with the
199. Sample curative instructions for many types of improper arguments are provided in
Appendix B.
200. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 252 (emphasis added).
201. See supra Section III.B.2.
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defendant before trial, and even before filing a motion in limine: who has
the power to request a mistrial, and when must the court rule on a mistrial
request?
First, if the lawyer and the client disagree on whether to request a
mistrial, with whom does the decision rest? Most attorneys, trial judges, and
even appellate courts do not know the answer. In one case, a trial judge
offered the defendant the opportunity for a mistrial, and “told him that
while the decision was his, he should seriously consider his attorney’s
advice.”202 After lengthy consultation with defense counsel, the defendant
elected not to follow his attorney’s advice to request a mistrial and instead
proceeded to verdict; the defendant was convicted. 203
On appeal, the defendant argued that this was a strategic decision that
should have been left to counsel. Such a decision, the defendant argued, did
not fall into the category of fundamental decisions that are reserved for the
client, such as whether to enter a plea or go to trial and, if there is a trial,
whether to testify.204 The court stated that it was “an intriguing and
sophisticated” question as to whether defense counsel or the defendant
“should be permitted to make a mistrial decision.”205 The court never truly
disagreed with the defendant, thereby implying that the decision might
actually rest with counsel, as the defendant had argued on appeal. The
court, however, dispensed with the issue by employing the doctrines of
“waiver” and “judicial estoppel.”206
But even if the mistrial decision is, in theory, left to the lawyer, it is
often—probably always—intertwined with decisions that are left to the
defendant. For example, the defendant has the constitutional right to
counsel of choice. But what if the defendant could not afford to pay his
lawyer for a second trial and would instead have to obtain state- or courtappointed counsel for the retrial? In that case, wouldn’t a mistrial request
implicate a constitutional right? And shouldn’t the decision whether to ask
for a mistrial be left to the defendant?
Similarly, many defendants are unable to post bail and therefore must
remain incarcerated during their cases—a key reason that a defendant has a
constitutional right to a speedy trial. But what if, due to court congestion,
unavailable witnesses, or some other reason, a mistrial would result in a
long delay? In that case, wouldn’t a mistrial request implicate yet another
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

State v. Washington, 419 N.W.2d 275, 276 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
Id.
Id. at 276-77.
Id. at 277.
Id.
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constitutional right? And, once again, shouldn’t the decision whether to ask
for a mistrial be left to the defendant? 207
For these situations, one appellate court offered valuable advice, which
may prove useful for defense attorneys: “Faced with the dilemma of this
disagreement between client and attorney, the trial court did the only
prudent thing. It urged [the defendant] to follow the attorney’s advice, [and]
advised [the defendant] that his lawyer was the person better equipped to
make this decision.”208
Second, while defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial likely must be
made before the jury returns its verdict (or sooner in some jurisdictions),
when must the court rule on the motion? In some states “a trial court may
declare a mistrial up to the point the jury’s verdict is accepted. A jury’s
verdict is not accepted until it is received in open court, the results
announced, the jury polled, if requested, and the judgment entered.”209 Such
timing would be ideal for the defendant. If jury verdict is “not guilty,”
defense counsel simply withdraws the mistrial motion and instead moves
for judgment on the verdict. This timing removes the risks associated with
asking for a mistrial.
While this may seem like an unfair advantage for the defendant, it is
actually the only fair way to proceed. After all, it was the prosecutor’s
misconduct—not that of the defendant or defense counsel—that provoked
the mistrial motion in the first place. Why should the prosecutor’s improper
behavior force the defendant to choose between two unattractive
alternatives: a tainted verdict or a costly retrial? Fairness and efficiency
require that the jury be allowed to return its verdict before any
determination is made as to whether a mistrial and potential retrial are even
necessary.210
The question then becomes whether defense counsel has any influence
over the timing of the court’s ruling. Counsel may consider coupling a
mistrial motion with the request that the court defer its ruling until after the
207. See State v. Jenich, 288 N.W.2d 114, 123 (Wis. 1980) (discussing the defendant’s
“‘valued right’ to secure a verdict from the first tribunal” rather than to request a mistrial).
208. Washington, 419 N.W.2d at 277 (emphasis added).
209. State v. Reid, 479 N.W.2d 572, 574 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added); see
also Gainer v. Koewler, 546 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the trial
judge “decided to take the motion under advisement” and deferred ruling until “[a]fter the
verdict and at the postverdict hearings”).
210. Many thanks to attorney Thomas Aquino, a fellow member of the Wisconsin
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, for alerting me to the case of Gainer v. Koewler,
the possibility of the trial judge taking a mistrial motion under advisement, and the potential
strategy of asking the trial judge to do so.
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jury returns its verdict, stressing the fairness- and efficiency-based
arguments set forth above. Alternatively, counsel may wish to propose such
timing in the motion in limine itself, thus obtaining an advance ruling on
the issue. Such a ruling would, in turn, allow counsel to more freely request
a mistrial as there would be no risk to the defendant in doing so.
But would a trial court be less likely to grant a mistrial request after the
jury returns a guilty verdict? And would an appellate court later turn
defense counsel’s request for a deferred ruling against the defendant,
finding that it somehow qualified or even negated the motion itself? After
all, courts have demonstrated, beyond any doubt, that they will break clean
through the boundaries of logic, reason, and fairness in order to affirm
defendants’ convictions.
Conclusion
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument is rampant. Unfortunately,
defense lawyers’ conventional, reactionary approach to the problem is often
ineffective and sometimes even exacerbates the harm. Rather than
following this ineffective approach, exposing the defense to potentially
damaging objections in front of the jury, defense counsel should utilize a
preemptive motion in limine to combat improper arguments before they are
ever made. Doing so may prevent the prosecutor from making improper
arguments in the first place and will alert the trial judge to the likelihood of
prosecutorial misconduct. Most importantly, in cases where a preemptive
motion in limine is granted and subsequently violated, the order will
establish a framework for addressing the misconduct in meaningful ways,
including providing the opportunity to draft thoughtful and effective
curative instructions, affording time for client consultation before
requesting the more serious remedy of a mistrial, and, in the event a mistrial
is declared, potentially protecting the defendant from re-prosecution.
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APPENDIX A: MOTION IN LIMINE
The following is a sample motion in limine. Defense counsel should
tailor all motions in limine, and all in-court strategies, to the jurisdiction’s
applicable substantive and procedural law and to the facts of the particular
case. Further, counsel should ensure that all sources (below) are accurate,
applicable, and have not been superseded by new law.
If defense counsel believes a particular judge will not be receptive to this
preemptive approach and lengthy motion in limine, counsel may still wish
to file a much shorter motion without the introductory material, without
seeking relief from the contemporaneous objection rule, and without
itemizing the types of improper argument. 211
[State Name]
[County Name]
[People or State or Commonwealth]
v.
[Defendant’s Name]
[Case No.]
DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION IN LIMINE RE:
PROSECUTOR’S CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Notice of Motion
[Date, time, and place of hearing]
Motion
The Defendant, appearing specially by [his / her] attorney and reserving
the right to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction, moves the Court for the entry
of orders as requested and pursuant to the authorities below.
Improper closing arguments by prosecutors have become the norm in
criminal trials. For several reasons, “prosecutorial recidivism—the
tendency of the same prosecutor or office to engage in misconduct
211. A shorter version might read as follows. “The defendant moves the Court for the
entry of an order that, if the prosecutor makes an improper closing argument of any kind: (1)
the words ‘objection, improper argument’ are sufficient to identify and preserve the issue for
the Court’s review; (2) the Court will, upon a timely request by defense counsel, hold a
hearing outside the jury’s presence before deliberations begin to discuss possible curative
instructions; and (3) in addition to any curative instructions issued by the Court, the
defendant may request a mistrial at any time before the jury returns its verdict.” Applicable
legal authorities should also be included.
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repeatedly, even in the face of admonishments from the [appellate]
court”—is widespread. Paul J. Spiegelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in
Closing Argument: The Role of Intent in Appellate Review, 1 J. App. Prac.
& Process 115, 116 (1999).
Although it is generally considered defense counsel’s responsibility to
protect his or her client from a prosecutor’s misconduct in closing
argument, there is also “an affirmative duty placed upon the trial court to
object on its own motion.” Warshafsky & Crivello, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR
WISCONSIN LAWYERS, § 34:09 (3d ed.).
The problem, however, is that a prosecutor’s improper closing argument
often poses difficulties for defense counsel and the trial court. On the one
hand, objecting to improper argument is not only difficult to do in the heat
of a jury trial, but “may serve only to repeat and attract attention to the
improper remark, and thereby compound the prejudicial effect.” Id.
On the other hand, though, not objecting fails to preserve the issue on its
merits, often resulting in a time-consuming “ineffective assistance of
counsel” hearing and, in some cases, an even more time-consuming second
trial. See, e.g., State v. Weiss, 752 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008)
(reversing conviction due to prosecutor’s improper argument about facts
not in evidence).
In sum, prosecutors routinely make improper closing arguments because
they are highly effective, difficult to counter, and rarely, if ever, punished.
Therefore, “the bar and, particularly, the bench, should be aware of the
phenomenon and take measures designed to increase the risks for those
attorneys who persist in this strategy.” Gainer v. Koewler, 546 N.W.2d
474, 478 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added) (discussing counsel’s
improper closing argument and violation of pretrial orders).
The defendant therefore seeks to address these matters preemptively to
(1) deter the prosecutor from making improper arguments in the first place,
(2) promote general trial efficiency, (3) avoid potentially counterproductive,
harmful objections during closing arguments, (4) greatly reduce the
likelihood of costly and time-consuming post-conviction hearings and a
subsequent retrial, and (5) put the prosecutor on notice that improper
argument will provoke a mistrial request by the defendant.
Therefore:
1. The defendant moves the Court to order the prosecutor not to engage
in the forms of improper argument set forth below in motion in limine
number five.
2. The defendant moves the Court to order that, if the prosecutor engages
in such forms of argument, the defendant’s objection is preserved
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based on this motion in limine and without the need for a
contemporaneous objection at trial.
a. When defense counsel raises an issue in a pretrial motion in
limine, to require an additional objection at trial would place
defense counsel “in a classic Catch-22 position. By not
objecting, [counsel] is held to waiver. By objecting, [counsel]
draws the jury’s attention to the very [argument] that the trial
court had already ruled [improper]. Recalling that one of the
purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule is fairness, we
will not apply the rule to permit such an unfair dilemma.” State
v. English-Lancaster, 642 N.W.2d 627 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)
(emphasis added).
b. Therefore, when defense counsel moves in limine to preclude the
prosecutor from making an improper argument at trial, and the
court grants the motion, counsel is relieved “from having to
object to the same issue of fact or law that arises at trial.” State v.
Bergeron, 470 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
c. Finally, despite being relieved of the obligation to object,
defense counsel still has the right to object to improper argument
when doing so would be in the best interests of the defendant, for
example, where an objection might terminate an improper
argument before the jury is able to feel its full impact.
3. The defendant moves the Court, if defense counsel so requests at the
conclusion of the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, to hold a conference
outside the jury’s presence and before it receives its final instructions
from the Court. The purpose of the conference is to discuss remedies
for any improper arguments made by the prosecutor, including but not
limited to the remedy of curative instructions.
a. Many instances of improper arguments—including, for example,
arguments that misstate the burden of proof—can be adequately
addressed by a curative instruction from the court.
b. However, pattern instructions and generic curative instructions
that merely state the obvious—for example, that “the words of
the attorneys . . . are not evidence and must not be considered by
you as evidence”—are not legally sufficient to cure the
prejudicial impact of improper argument. Jordan v. Hepp, 831
F.3d 837, 849 (7th Cir. 2016).
c. Therefore, a post-argument, pre-jury deliberation conference will
allow the court and defense counsel to craft effective curative
instructions that are tailored to the specific improper arguments.
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4. The defendant moves the Court to order that, in addition to any
curative instructions issued by the Court, the defendant’s right to
request a mistrial as a remedy for improper argument is preserved and
may be exercised at any time before the jury returns its verdict. More
specifically:
a. Some types of improper argument “may be too clearly
prejudicial” for even a well-crafted “curative instruction to
mitigate their effect[.]” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S.
637, 644 (1974). However, a mistrial may result in a retrial,
which can be costly for a defendant both in terms of his money
and, when unable to post bail, his liberty. That is, even though a
“[m]istrial is the only remedy certain to ensure that the
prejudicial conduct will not taint the ultimate verdict . . . its
application may unfairly burden the defendant.” J. Thomas
Sullivan, Prosecutor Misconduct in Closing Argument in
Arkansas Trials, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 213, 219
(1998).
b. Given the severity of the mistrial remedy from the defendant’s
standpoint, counsel should not request a mistrial until after
careful consultation with the client. This can be accomplished
after jury begins its deliberations and before it returns its verdict
to the Court. Wisconsin law even holds that counsel may “move
for a mistrial before the jury returns its judgment.” State v.
Rockette, 718 N.W.2d 269, 277 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
c. This motion in limine will also serve to put the prosecutor on
notice that improper arguments, including those set forth below,
will provoke the defendant’s request for a mistrial and may bar
the state from retrying the defendant. “[I]f a defendant’s motion
for mistrial is prompted by prosecutorial or judicial misconduct
which was intended ‘to provoke’ defendant’s motion or was
otherwise ‘motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or
prejudice’ the defendant or ‘to afford the prosecution a more
favorable opportunity to convict’ the defendant, double jeopardy
does bar further prosecution.” State v. Jenich, 288 N.W.2d 114,
123 (Wis. 1980).
5. Finally, the defendant moves the Court for a pretrial order that the
prosecutor not engage in the following forms of argument:
a. If the defendant testifies, argument that the defendant has a
motive to lie because [he or she] is charged with a crime and/or
is facing a criminal conviction.
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i Such an argument would render meaningless the defendant’s
constitutional right to testify in his or her own defense, and
would contradict the Court’s instruction to the jury that “[t]he
defendant has testified in this case, and you should not
discredit the testimony just because the defendant is charged
with a crime.” Wis. Crim. J.I. 300.
ii Such an argument is improper because it “impl[ies] that a
defendant is presumed to lie simply because of her status as a
defendant” and because it “diminish[es] the defendant’s
fundament right to the presumption of innocence.” People v.
Crowder, 607 N.E.2d 277, 280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
b. If the defendant does not testify, direct or indirect comment on
the defendant’s silence during and/or before trial.
i First, “comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the
inquisitorial system of criminal justice, which the Fifth
Amendment outlaws.” Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
614 (1965). This includes “indirect comments, including
references to ‘uncontroverted’ testimony, when . . . the only
one who could have controverted it was the defendant who
remained silent throughout trial.” United States v. Cotnam, 88
F.3d 487, 493-94 (7th Cir. 1996).
ii Second, when the defendant does not testify, his/her silence
before trial, whether pre- or post-Miranda, is not admissible
and comment thereon would also violate the Fifth
Amendment. State v. Mayo, 734 N.W.2d 115, 127 (Wis.
2007).
c. If the defendant testifies, accusations that the defendant “lied” or
is “a liar,” or other inflammatory name-calling. Branding the
defendant a liar is inflammatory name-calling that usurps the
jury’s role and duty “to weigh the testimony of witnesses” and
decide witness credibility. Wis. Crim. J.I. 300. Similarly, other
name calling is “not relevant” and “highly prejudicial.” State v.
Jorgensen, 754 N.W.2d 77, 88 (Wis. 2008) (reversing conviction
for prosecutor’s argument that defendant was “chronic
alcoholic”).
d. Disparaging defense counsel or counsel’s role in the criminal
justice system. For example, the argument that “defense
counsel’s job is to get his client off the hook,” and similar
arguments, are “improper and deserving of condemnation.” State
v. Mayo, 734 N.W.2d 115, 121-22 (Wis. 2007). See also United
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States v. Xiong, 262 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (“disparaging
remarks directed at defense counsel are reprehensible” and could
lead “the jury to believe that the defense’s characterization of the
evidence should not be trusted”).
e. Vouching, including the expression of a personal opinion about a
witness’s truthfulness or the guilt of the defendant.
i First, “A lawyer shall not in trial . . . assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a
witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a
cause, the credibility of a witness, . . . or the guilt or
innocence of an accused.” Wis. SCR 20:3.4(e).
ii Second, it is also improper to vouch for a witness by
referencing matters not in evidence. For example, it is
improper to vouch for police-officer witnesses by telling the
jury, “They work hard. They do a tough job. . . . They work
long, long hours. You weigh their testimony against the
defendant’s.” State v. Smith, 671 N.W.2d 854 (Wis. Ct. App.
2003).
f. Argument that incorporates facts not presented in the evidentiary
portion of trial. “[I]t is improper for a prosecutor to provide the
jury with information, which allows the jury to consider facts not
in evidence when determining guilt.” State v. Jorgensen, 754
N.W.2d 77, 88 (Wis. 2008) (reversing conviction for
prosecutorial misconduct, including prosecutorial “testimony” in
closing argument that the defendant was unable to crossexamine).
g. Argument that misstates the law, including but not limited to the
state’s burden of proof.
i For example, arguing that the jury should “search for the
truth” is improper because it “misstates the jury’s duty and
sweeps aside the State’s burden.” State v. Berube, 286 P.3d
402, 411 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). “‘[S]eeking the truth’
suggests determining whose version of events is more likely
true, the government’s or the defendant’s, and thereby
intimates a preponderance of evidence standard.” United
States v. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir.
1994). This distinction is accurately captured by Vermont’s
instruction to its jurors stating that, if they have a reasonable
doubt, they must find the defendant “not guilty even if [they]
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think that the charge is probably true.” Vt. Crim. Jury
Instructions, Reasonable Doubt.
ii Even prosecutors admit that jury trials are not searches for the
truth. For example, when a defendant is acquitted at trial and
the state later tries to use the facts underlying that acquittal as
“other acts” evidence in a subsequent trial, prosecutors have
argued, and Wisconsin courts have held, that “an acquittal
only establishes that there was a reasonable doubt in the
jury’s mind as to whether the defendant committed the prior
crime, not that the defendant is innocent.” State v. Landrum,
528 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added).
h. Argument that creates “straw men” or misstates the defendant’s
theory of defense. For example, when the defense argues that the
police-officer witnesses were mistaken about the perpetrator’s
identity, the prosecutor is not allowed to misstate this defense by
arguing, “While defense attorneys try and say, well, we’re not
saying the police are lying; what else are they saying?” This
straw-man argument improperly expresses “the prosecutor’s
self-imposed frustration at his own . . . suggestion that testifying
police officers may have lied.” State v. Smith, 671 N.W.2d 854,
858 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing conviction).
i. Argument that invokes the emotions of the jurors or directly or
indirectly invites them to decide the case on matters outside of
the evidence. Arguments “appealing to the jurors’ emotions and
inviting the jury to consider the social consequences of its
verdict” are improper. United States v. Morgan, 113 F.3d 85, 90
(7th Cir. 1997). More broadly, “[c]omments that invite
conviction for reasons other than because the defendant was
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt are improper.” United
States v. Severson, 3 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 1993).
j. In rebuttal, argument that goes beyond the scope of the defense
counsel’s closing argument.
i First, the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument is narrow in scope:
“rebuttal shall be limited to matters raised by [defense
counsel] in argument.” WIS. STAT. § 805.10 (2017).
ii Second, improper arguments are not justified—and in fact are
most harmful—in the rebuttal portion of closing. And for the
prosecutor to justify improper argument under the “invited
response” doctrine, all of the following must be true: (1) there
first was an improper argument by defense counsel; (2) the
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prosecutor “objected to the defense counsel’s improper
statements with a request that the court give a timely warning
and curative instruction to the jury”; and (3) the curative
instruction was insufficient. United States v. Young, 470 U.S.
1, 13 (1985) (holding prosecutor’s improper argument was
not an invited response due to failure to object to defense
counsel’s improper argument).
[Defense counsel’s signature block]
[Defense counsel’s bar number]
[Defense counsel’s contact information]
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APPENDIX B: CURATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
The following are examples of curative instructions for improper
arguments. The instructions can be used as a template, but must be crafted
to the particular argument and the applicable law in the case at hand.
A. Curative instruction for prosecutor’s argument that the defendant’s
testimony should be discredited because he or she is charged with a
crime and/or facing a penalty.
“The defendant testified in this case and denied the allegation. The
prosecutor argued or implied that you should disregard the defendant’s
testimony because [he or she] is charged with a crime and stands to be
convicted. This argument is not valid. If the argument were valid, then
every defendant who denied the charges against him would be guilty
merely because the prosecutor filed a criminal complaint. That is not the
law. The prosecutor’s argument was therefore not proper, and you must
disregard it entirely. As I previously instructed you, the defendant is
presumed innocent. You must not discredit [his or her] testimony just
because [he or she] is charged with a crime, and you may not convict [him
or her] unless, after your deliberations, you find that the state proved every
element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
B. Curative instruction for prosecutor’s comment on the defendant’s
decision not to testify.
This type of improper argument does not lend itself well to a curative
instruction, as the argument directly implicates a fundamental constitutional
right and an instruction would merely draw additional attention to the
defendant’s decision to remain silent. In these cases, while crafting a
curative instruction is possible, a mistrial request should be considered.
C. Curative instruction for prosecutor calling the defendant a liar or other
derogatory names.
“During closing argument, the prosecutor called the defendant a liar and
implied that you should accept that conclusion and discredit the defendant’s
testimony. The prosecutor’s comment was not proper, and you must
disregard it. Issues of witness credibility are for you, the jury, to decide.”
OR
“During closing argument, the prosecutor called the defendant a [name
here]. The prosecutor’s name-calling was not proper, and that kind of tactic
is demeaning not only to the defendant but also to the Court and to these
proceedings. You must disregard the prosecutor’s comment and base your
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decision on the evidence or lack of evidence in this case, applying the
burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt as I have instructed you.”
D. Curative instruction for prosecutor’s disparaging remarks about defense
counsel.
“During closing argument the prosecutor said that defense counsel
[describe derogatory comment]. This argument is not proper. It is
demeaning not only to defense counsel but also to the Court and to these
proceedings. The defense lawyer is a critical part of our criminal justice
system. The state has a tremendous power and resources to pursue
convictions, and one of the defense lawyer’s roles is to vigorously
challenge the state’s case to protect his or her client from conviction unless
the state can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We all benefit from a
system where defense lawyers vigorously defend their clients. You must
therefore disregard the prosecutor’s comments entirely, and you must reach
your verdict after a careful consideration of the evidence or lack of
evidence in this case, applying the burden of proof of beyond a reasonable
doubt as I have instructed you.”
E. Curative instruction for prosecutor’s vouching.
This form of misconduct is so varied, and includes both direct and
indirect forms of vouching, that any curative instruction must be
specifically tailored to the particular improper argument.
F. Curative instruction for prosecutor’s argument incorporating facts not in
evidence.
“In closing argument the prosecutor said [describe prosecutor
‘testimony’]. However, the purpose of closing argument is for the lawyers
to discuss evidence that was introduced at trial. The prosecutor’s statement
that [describe prosecutor ‘testimony’] was never introduced at trial, and the
defense lawyer had no chance to cross-examine it or to present evidence to
disprove it. You must therefore disregard the prosecutor’s statements on
this matter and instead base your verdict only on the evidence or the lack of
evidence from the trial.”
G. Curative instruction for prosecutor misstating the burden of proof.
“The prosecutor argued that [describe prosecutor argument]. This
argument misstates the burden of proof. The law, as I have instructed you,
is as follows. You must start with the presumption that the defendant is
innocent of the charge against him. The state has the burden to prove each
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and every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if,
after your deliberations, you conclude that the allegation against the
defendant is probably true, that is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
you must therefore find the defendant not guilty.”
H. Curative instruction for the prosecutors’ straw-man arguments and/or
misstating the defendant’s theory of defense.
“The prosecutor argued to you that [describe prosecutor argument], and
then attributed this argument to defense counsel. That was not proper.
Defense counsel never argued that [describe prosecutor’s argument]. You
must therefore disregard the prosecutor’s comments. The theory of the
defense in this case is [describe actual theory of defense]. You must return a
verdict of not guilty unless, after your deliberations, you find that the state
proved every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
I. Curative instruction for prosecutor arguments invoking juror emotions.
This type of improper argument does not lend itself well to a curative
instruction, as it is particularly difficult to “un-ring the bell” once emotions
have been stirred. For example, prosecutor arguments that society, children,
or even the jurors themselves will be at risk of harm if the defendant is
acquitted are highly damaging. In these cases, while crafting a curative
instruction might be possible, a mistrial request should seriously be
considered.
J. Curative instruction for prosecutor arguments going beyond the scope of
rebuttal.
1. If the prosecutor went beyond the scope of rebuttal but merely
repeated an otherwise proper argument made in his or her first closing
argument, a curative instruction is not likely to be effective; further, trial
judges may be unwilling to give an instruction under these circumstances.
2. If the prosecutor went beyond the scope of rebuttal by making a new,
but otherwise proper, argument, an instruction explaining the purpose of
rebuttal, combined with a directive to disregard the prosecutor’s comment,
may be effective.
3. If the prosecutor went beyond the scope of rebuttal by making an
improper argument, the curative instruction would include the language in
Instruction J.2., above, and the instruction’s substance would depend on the
specific form of improper argument (see Instructions A.–I., above).
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